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The reputation and credibility of the Department of Justice were badly 
tarnished during the Bush administration.  This article focuses on concerns 
regarding the role of partisan politics.1  Critics charge that during the Bush 
administration improper partisan political considerations pervasively influenced a 
wide range of decisions including the selection of immigration judges, summer 
interns and line attorneys; the assignment of career attorneys to particular details; 
the evaluation of the performance of United States Attorneys; and the decision 
whether and when to file charges in cases with political ramifications. 
The Inspector General’s lengthy and highly critical reports have substantiated 
some of these charges.2  The first two Inspector General (IG) Reports found that 
the Department improperly used political criteria in hiring and assigning some 
immigration judges, interns, and career prosecutors.3  The third report 
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1   Other serious concerns about the Department have been raised, particularly in connection 
with its role in the war on terror.  For example, the Department has been the subject of intense 
criticism for legal analysis that led to the authorization of brutal interrogation techniques for 
detainees.  See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney 
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1969–70 n.204 (2008) (collecting examples of the “burgeoning 
literature” on the work of lawyers in the Bush administration who offered formal opinions that 
purported to confer authority to torture and noting that most of the scholarship is “roundly 
condemnatory”). 
2   The reports that I call the Inspector General Reports were prepared jointly by the IG and 
the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR).  These reports are compiled 
in AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. 
ATTORNEYS]; AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND 
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (2008), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN 
OFFICE OF AG]; and AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM (2008), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND 
SLIP].  
3   See IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND SLIP, supra note 2, at 98 (concluding that in 
2002 “the data indicated that the Committee considered political or ideological affiliations when 
deselecting candidates” for entry level attorney positions and summer internships, and in 2006 “the 
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recommended that a special prosecutor be appointed to determine whether one 
U.S. Attorney was removed in an effort to influence voter fraud and corruption 
prosecutions.4  As to the other U.S. Attorney dismissals, the report found that they 
were done in an astonishingly slipshod fashion with little or no oversight (and no 
candor during the Congressional and IG investigations), but in general, not for 
improper reasons.5 
There has been no resolution of other charges, made in Congressional 
hearings and in the media, that political considerations improperly influenced the 
course of other individual prosecutions, and that overall the Department’s 
prosecutions were disproportionately focused on Democratic office holders, party 
activists, and donors. 
The Inspector General has proposed specific responses to some of the 
problems identified in his reports, but these recommendations go principally to the 
hiring and assignment of immigration judges, summer interns, and career 
attorneys.6  Those are the easy issues because there is considerable agreement that 
politics should play no role at all in decisions concerning career and nonpartisan 
positions.  The only challenge is to make sure that this principle is reiterated and 
enforced. 
The more difficult issue concerns the proper role of politics at the level of the 
U.S. Attorneys.  The position of U.S. Attorney is, in a formal sense, plainly 
political: U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the president with the advice and 
consent of the Senate,7 and they serve at the president’s pleasure.8  Once selected, 
however, U.S. Attorneys are expected to leave behind partisan politics, adhering to 
                                                                                                                            
Screening Committee inappropriately used political and ideological considerations to deselect many 
candidates”); IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at 135–37 (finding 
political considerations were used to evaluate candidates for certain career positions, including 
AUSA positions, and in the selection or approval of career attorney candidates for temporary details, 
and that the “most systematic use of political or ideological affiliations occurred” in the selection of 
immigration judges). 
4   IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 186–200, 357–58 
(recommending that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate the removal of U.S. Attorney 
David Iglesias to determine whether there were attempts to pressure him to accelerate his charging 
decision in a corruption case or to initiate voter fraud investigations to affect the outcome of an 
election, and to determine whether criminal conduct, including false statements and obstruction of 
justice, had occurred). 
5   Id. at 325, 356–58 (stating that removal process was “fundamentally flawed,” conducted in 
a fashion that was “unsystematic and arbitrary . . . with little oversight,” and noting that 
Congressional testimony and statements by the Attorney General and other Department officials were 
“inconsistent, misleading, and inaccurate in many respects”). 
6   IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND SLIP, supra note 2, at 101–02 (recommending 
revision of internal manuals, statements, and orders; additional briefing of political appointees; and 
increased vigilance to ensure that political affiliations are not used as a criteria for evaluating 
candidates). 
7   28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006). 
8   28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2006). 
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the norm of prosecutorial neutrality.  In this context, prosecutorial neutrality 
means, at a minimum, that the decision whether and when to bring charges in 
individual cases should be made without regard to either the political affiliation of 
the individuals involved or the resulting benefit (or harm) to either political party.9  
But one might argue that U.S. Attorneys who are selected by an overtly political 
process and supervised by other political actors will naturally be influenced in their 
decisions whether and when to prosecute, and that they will be likely to bring cases 
to embarrass or disable political opponents, but fail to bring charges against 
officials in their own party or their supporters.  Some critics think that is exactly 
what occurred during the Bush administration, and during earlier administrations 
as well.10  Moreover, the nature of contemporary federal criminal law magnifies 
the potential for mischief, because the definitions of the relevant offenses are both 
broad and vague, giving the prosecutors extraordinarily wide discretion on which 
there are few checks.11  
The current structure and the problems encountered during the Bush 
administration raise the question whether the role of the U.S. Attorney should be 
reconceptualized.  If partisan political considerations should not influence 
prosecutorial decisions, why not insulate the position of U.S. Attorney from 
politics by redefining it as a nonpartisan career appointment?  There are structural 
reasons to think that this would be desirable because it would place the Justice 
Department’s structure in rough parity with that of other cabinet departments and 
reduce the strain on the confirmation process at the beginning of a new presidential 
administration.  The strain on the confirmation process could also be reduced by 
recharacterizing the U.S. Attorneys as political appointees not subject to Senate 
confirmation.  The current structure of the Justice Department is anomalous.  In 
comparison with other agencies, the Department has a disproportionate number of 
presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation.  During the Bush 
administration from 2001 to 2008, the Senate confirmed 134 appointees to 
positions in the Justice Department, including the U.S. Attorneys for the 93 federal 
judicial districts.12  In comparison, during the same period the Departments of 
Treasury and Defense each had fewer than 30 presidential appointees confirmed by 
                                                                                                                            
9   For a general discussion of the various elements of prosecutorial neutrality and the 
difficulty of applying that concept, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial 
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837.  See also id. at 869 (stating that one element of prosecutorial 
neutrality is nonpartisanship, which “encompasses both avoiding obligations to the political parties 
with which they are affiliated (and which may have helped them obtain their positions) and holding 
themselves above public outcry and frenzy about particular cases”).  
10  See infra Part I.C and text accompanying notes 272–73.  
11  See infra Part II.C.2. 
12  Memorandum from Amy Taylor, Reference Librarian, Duke Law Library, to Professor 
Sara Sun Beale, Duke Law Sch. 1 (Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that as of Oct. 29, 
2008, there had been 147 nominations and 134 confirmations for the Department of Justice, 
excluding nominations of judges and U.S. marshals, which are attributable to the Department for 
some purposes). 
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the Senate, though both have more employees than the Justice Department.13  The 
Department of State’s numbers were comparable to those of the Justice 
Department, but that reflects the inclusion of all ambassadors.14  Indeed, I am not 
aware of any agency other than the Justice Department in which the head of each 
small domestic field office is a presidential appointee subject to Senate 
confirmation. 
The presidential appointment of the U.S. Attorneys tends to reinforce a degree 
of autonomy for the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in each district, and this article also 
explores a distinct but closely related issue: the appropriate degree of centralization 
of authority within the Department of Justice.  
This article first sets forth an account of the problems disclosed by the IG’s 
report and related congressional investigations, and then explores the historical 
development of the role of the U.S. Attorneys, their relationship to the Attorney 
General and the Department of Justice, and the role they play in the contemporary 
federal criminal justice system.  With that background in mind, I return to the 
question whether it would be desirable to alter the character of the position.  I 
conclude that, on balance, converting the U.S. Attorneys to a career civil service 
role is neither politically feasible nor desirable.  No one doubts that the Attorney 
General and the heads of the divisions within the Department (which I will refer to 
collectively as the leadership of “Main Justice”) are and will always be political 
appointees.  The appointment of these officials is the mechanism by which each 
new presidential administration establishes and carries out its policies and 
priorities.  As long as the U.S. Attorneys remain subject to the oversight and 
direction of the political leadership at Main Justice, it will not be possible to 
preclude entirely the possibility that political considerations might improperly 
influence decisions in individual prosecutions.  Nor would it be desirable to 
eliminate the requirement of Senate confirmation for U.S. Attorneys.   
The current appointment process for U.S. Attorneys has several advantages.  
It creates a desirable counterweight to Main Justice in two distinct ways.  First, it 
provides a political counterweight, because the U.S. Attorneys have their own 
political influence and constituencies.  Second, because the U.S. Attorneys are 
political figures drawn from their districts and confirmed with the support of their 
home-state senators, they also serve as a counterweight to excessive centralization 
and uniformity within the federal system.  There is real value in a structure that 
delegates federal prosecutorial power to local districts, reinforcing federalism and 
allowing federal law to be adapted to different conditions.  The current system also 
                                                                                                                            
13  Id. at 2 (noting that during the same period the Treasury Department had 25 nominations 
and 25 confirmations, and the Department of Defense had 28 nominations and 27 confirmations).  
Between 2001 and 2006, the average number of employees in each department was as follows: 
107,146 in the Justice Department, 114,574 in the Treasury, and 604,758 in the Department of 
Defense.  Id. at 3–5. 
14  Id. at 1–2 (noting that the Department of State had 228 confirmations, including 153 
ambassadors, during the same period; State had a total of 259 nominations, including 181 
ambassadors and 78 other nominations).  
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has several other major advantages.  A presidential appointment gives the U.S. 
Attorney desirable prestige that helps him or her carry out the federal law 
enforcement mission and it increases the accountability of the U.S. Attorneys.  
Bringing in an outsider may also increase the fairness and accuracy of federal 
prosecuting by reducing institutional tunnel vision.  I am agnostic on the final issue 
which system would attract the stronger candidates to the position.   
Although the advantages of maintaining the current model of the U.S. 
Attorney as a presidential appointee outweigh the disadvantages, there are still 
reasons for concern.  Accordingly, I argue that serious consideration should be 
given to mechanisms that would moderate the effect of partisan politics at the 
appointment stage, and mechanisms to help insulate U.S. Attorneys from improper 
partisan pressures that may arise from within the executive branch, from Congress, 
or from local political leaders. 
Section I of this article provides background on recent events that suggest the 
nature of the problem.  Section II describes the history and contemporary role of 
the U.S. Attorney.  Section III describes the political complexity of the current 
appointments process.  Section IV considers the options for reform.  Two possible 
objections could be made to undertaking this analysis.  First, fundamental change 
is unlikely, because it would diminish the power of the president and the Senate, 
both of which must concur to amend the legislation governing the selection and 
removal of U.S. Attorneys.  And second, the political corruption cases that are at 
the center of this analysis are only a small fraction of the federal criminal caseload.  
Despite the enormous political obstacles, I believe it is important to take seriously 
the option of restructuring the role of the U.S. Attorney to reduce the danger of 
improper partisan influence, while at the same time taking into account the broader 
ramifications of such a change.  The unprecedented power now wielded by federal 
prosecutors has heightened the stakes, making it imperative to look with a fresh 
eye at the structure that governs federal prosecutions.  And even though federal 
prosecutions for political corruption make up only a small portion of the federal 
caseload, they perform a critical function, policing the integrity of the government 
at the federal, state, and local levels.  It may be true that no fundamental change 
will occur in the absence of a scandal or some other major shock to the system, but 
such scandals have occurred in the past and may occur again.  One of the questions 
examined in Part I of this article is whether events during the Bush Administration 
demonstrate the need for such fundamental change. 
Although the IG reports, Congressional investigations, and my review of the 
evolution of the federal system provide a rich basis against which to consider these 
issues, I note with regret the lack of any empirical research assessing the impact of 
the selection process for U.S. Attorneys.  
 
I. SIGNS OF A NEED FOR REFORM? 
 
Recent events have shone a spotlight on concerns about the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in the federal system, providing rich background against 
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which to assess the need for reform.  These events include the removal of nine U.S. 
Attorneys, changes in the procedure for appointing interim U.S. Attorneys, and 
evidence that partisan motivations may have influenced politically sensitive 
prosecutions. 
 
A. The United States Attorney Firings 
 
The firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 sparked a public firestorm that 
prompted both Congress and the IG to investigate.15  Although both Congress and 
the IG considered the circumstances surrounding each of the cases, I will focus on 
four that are illustrative of the key issues raised by the current system of appointing 
and removing U.S. Attorneys: David Iglesias, Todd Graves, Bud Cummins, and 
Carol Lam. 
 
1. David Iglesias 
 
The IG found that the most serious allegations concerned the removal of 
David Iglesias, who served as U.S. Attorney in New Mexico.16  The IG report 
concluded “with reasonable assurance that the complaints from New Mexico 
Republican politicians and party activists about Iglesias’ handling of voter fraud 
and corruption cases were the reasons for his removal as U.S. Attorney.”17  In his 
Congressional testimony Iglesias expressed his own belief that he was asked to 
resign because he failed to respond to political pressure to indict before the 2006 
                                                                                                                            
15  See, e.g., Todd J. Gillman, Embattled AG Gonzales Resigns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 
28, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 16775486 (reporting attorney general’s resignation and relating it 
to the “the uproar over the bungled, politically charged firings of eight U.S. Attorneys”); Amy 
Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Senators Deride Justice Reassignments: Prosecutor Firings and Staff 
Decisions Draw Hill Criticism, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at A3 (discussing the Senate reaction to 
the U.S. Attorney firings and allegations of partisan hiring practices); Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, 
Voter-Fraud Complaints Drove Dismissals, WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4 (discussing allegation 
that the actions of the fired U.S. Attorneys with regard to voter fraud cases were factors in the firings, 
especially that of David Iglesias); Tom Hamburger, A Targeted Prosecutor, a Pattern, L.A. TIMES, 
May 31, 2007, at 1 (describing “backlash among some Minnesota Republicans” and their calls for 
attorney general’s resignation “largely as a result of the U.S. attorney firings” and revelations about 
pressures on local U.S. Attorney concerning Indian voting rights); Jennifer Sullivan, Sullivan Picked 
to Keep Serving as U.S. Attorney, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at B1 (noting “uproar” over the 
firing of local U.S. Attorney and others “led to congressional hearings, and U.S. Attorney General 
Alberto Gonzales eventually resigned”); Andrew Zajac, Pointing the Way For Prosecutors: Under 
Fire, Not In Retreat, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 2007, at 4 (describing “political crisis over the firing of nine 
U.S. attorneys, a rare potential vote of no-confidence in the Senate and numerous calls for [the 
attorney general’s] resignation, and criticizing his response as “tightening the leash on the men and 
women who prosecute federal crimes across the nation”). 
16  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 149–200 (discussing 
circumstances of Iglesias’ removal). 
17  Id. at 197. 
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election.18  He described receiving calls from both Senator Domenici and 
Representative Wilson regarding the status of a pending corruption matter and 
stated that in both instances he felt that he was being pressured to bring an 
indictment before the November election.19  After the Domenici call he “felt ill,” 
because he “believed Domenici had asked for confidential information about an 
ongoing investigation, and that Iglesias would pay in some way for refusing to 
cooperate with him.”20  Domenici admitted calling Iglesias but denied any 
improper intent.21  Senator Domenici also made multiple calls to the Attorney 
General and to the Deputy Attorney General complaining about Iglesias’ 
performance.22  Additionally, Iglesias received pressure on multiple occasions 
from local Republican officials demanding action on voter fraud before the 
elections.23  Domenici and state Republican leaders also complained about Iglesias 
to the various officials in the White House, including Karl Rove.24 
The IG report concludes that the facts uncovered to date may establish 
criminal conduct as well as pressure on Iglesias to violate Departmental 
regulations and/or professional standards.  In the IG’s view, an attempt to pressure 
a prosecutor to accelerate the filing of political corruption charges or to initiate 
voter fraud investigations for the purposes of affecting the outcome of an 
upcoming election would clearly be improper and might constitute a crime.25  
Moreover, under both departmental regulations and professional standards, Iglesias 
had a duty to prosecute cases without regard to partisan political considerations.26  
Departmental regulations, which are intended to shield prosecutors from improper 
political pressures, also require that any requests from members of Congress to 
                                                                                                                            
18  Id. at 152. 
19  Id. at 152.  See also id. at 159–60 (describing Rep. Wilson’s 2004 letter to Iglesias 
complaining about what she perceived to be voter fraud in her district and Wilson’s dissatisfaction 
with his response). 
20  Id. at 179.  
21  Domenici admitted making the call and also recommending Iglesias’ removal, but he 
denied pressuring or threatening Iglesias.  The Senate Select Committee on Ethics investigated the 
call and issued a Public Letter of Qualified Admonition to the Senator.  Id. at 180–81.  The letter 
stated that the call created an appearance of impropriety, but that the investigation had found “no 
substantial evidence to determine that [Domenici] attempted to improperly influence an ongoing 
investigation.”  Id. at 181. 
22  Id. at 168–70, 174–75, 179–81.  
23  Id. at 158–59, 161–62, 164. 
24  Id. at 165–66, 172–74, 190. 
25  Id. at 199–200 (suggesting that such pressure could constitute obstruction of justice or wire 
fraud). 
26  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.000 & 9-
27.260(A)(3) [hereinafter USAM]; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-1.3(f) (3d ed. 1993) (prosecutor’s professional judgment should not be 
influenced by his or her political interests); id. at 3-3.9(d) (in making decision to prosecute, 
“prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which 
might be involved”). 
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U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for confidential information must be promptly reported, 
but Iglesias failed to report the calls by Domenici and Wilson.27  Finally, the IG 
noted that other criminal conduct—such as false statements to Congress or the IG 
investigators—may have occurred during the investigation of Iglesias’ removal.28 
The IG was unable to uncover the full factual record because some key 
witnesses—including Karl Rove, Harriet Miers, and Senator Domenici—refused to 
be interviewed, and critical documents were not made available.29  Indeed, the 
record does not establish whether the individuals who sought Iglesias’ removal 
were acting solely on the belief that he was not competently prosecuting 
worthwhile cases or for the purpose of influencing the upcoming elections.30  
Accordingly, the IG recommended the appointment of a special counsel to 
continue the investigation,31 and the Attorney General accepted this 
recommendation, appointing a special prosecutor to complete the investigation of 
the removal of Iglesias and related matters.32 
Given the facts reported by the IG, the Iglesias case reveals the potential for 
partisan pressures to be exerted on U.S. Attorneys from multiple sources.  Some of 
the pressure on Iglesias came directly from Congress and, particularly, from 
Senator Domenici, upon whose influence and patronage Iglesias had relied.  
Iglesias regarded Senator Domenici as his “mentor.”33  Indeed, before Iglesias 
became U.S. Attorney, he met with Senator Domenici at an Albuquerque 
restaurant for what Iglesias later described as “a kiss-the-ring ceremony that gave 
                                                                                                                            
27  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 194–95 (citing USAM § 1-
8.010). 
28  Id. at 198.  The White House has also asserted executive privilege to block the 
Congressional investigation.  See infra note 70 and accompanying text. 
29  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 153–54.  In March 2009 the 
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee reportedly negotiated an agreement under which Rove 
and Miers would give depositions under oath, though they would not testify in public.  Susan 
Crabtree, Rove, Conyers Reach Deal on Testimony, THE HILL, Mar. 4, 2009, 
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/rove-conyers-reach-deal-on-testimony-2009-03-04.html.    
30  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 199. 
31  Id. at 198. 
32  Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Nora Dannehy, Acting United States 
Attorney in Connecticut, “to conduct further investigation as needed, and ultimately to determine 
whether any prosecutable offense was committed with regard to the removal of a U.S. Attorney or the 
testimony of any witness related to the U.S. Attorney removals.”  Press Release, Statement by 
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey on the Report of an Investigation into the Removal of Nine 
U.S. Attorneys in 2006 (Sept. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-opa-859.html.  Mukasey said that Dannehy would 
exercise the authority of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for purposes of this 
matter and report to him through the Deputy Attorney General.  Id.  See also Eric Lichtblau & Sharon 
Otterman, Special Prosecutor Named in Attorney Firings Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/washington/30attorney.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
(describing Dannehy’s background and the events leading up to appointment). 
33  DAVID IGLESIAS WITH DAVIN SEAY, IN JUSTICE: INSIDE THE SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 52 (2008). 
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[him] the go-ahead to pursue [his] ambitions according to Domenici’s wisdom and 
wishes.”34  Local Republican politicians and party activists also sought to influence 
Iglesias directly.  Pressure was also channeled through the White House and the 
senior leadership in the Department, which received complaints about Iglesias 
from state party leaders as well as Domenici and Wilson.  Indeed, although Iglesias 
served at the pleasure of the president, he recognized that he also had to contend 
with political forces generated in New Mexico.35 
As recognized in the IG report, Iglesias’ removal also spotlights the inevitable 
difficulty in separating improper partisan motivations from proper support for 
bringing well-founded cases involving political corruption or voter fraud by 
members of the political party that does not control the executive branch. 
 
2. Todd Graves 
 
The IG also found that political pressure from the home-state senator was the 
reason for the forced resignation of a second U.S. Attorney, Todd Graves, who 
served as U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Missouri.36  In Graves’s case, 
however, the IG concluded that the pressure was unrelated to the work of the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office.  Graves, whose brother was a Missouri congressman, earned the 
ire of Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond’s staff when he refused to become involved 
in a dispute between the staffs of the senator and the congressman.37  In his 
interview with the IG, the former U.S. Attorney confirmed the “‘friction’” between 
the congressional and senatorial staffs, his refusal to use his influence to have the 
congressman’s chief of staff fired, and that he was informed by Bond’s staff that as 
a result “‘they could no longer protect [his] job.’”38 
The IG found it troubling that the Department of Justice made no effort in 
Graves’s case to protect the “independence of federal prosecutors, by ensuring that 
otherwise effective U.S. Attorneys are not removed for improper political 
reasons.”39  Indeed, little, if any, effort was made by Departmental officials even to 
determine the reasons for the pressure from Bond’s staff for Graves’s removal.40  
 
3. Bud Cummins 
 
The IG concluded that the main reason H. E. “Bud” Cummins III was asked 
to resign from his position as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas 
                                                                                                                            
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 53 (“To assume that being U.S. Attorney, at that time and in that state, would not 
come with any political baggage would be like walking right into a minefield.”). 
36  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 99–114. 
37  Id. at 105–08, 111–14. 
38  Id. at 108. 
39  Id. at 113. 
40  Id. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:369 
 
378
was to open up a position for a former White House official.41  Deputy Attorney 
General Paul McNulty testified to Congress that Cummins was dismissed solely to 
make way for Tim Griffin, a former aide to senior White House official Karl 
Rove.42  The Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, said in e-mail that 
it was “important to . . . Karl” that Griffin have the position of U.S. Attorney in the 
Eastern District of Arkansas.43  Although some Departmental officials had 
suggested that Cummins was removed because of his weak performance, the IG 
found this claim to be unsupported.44  To the contrary, the director of the Executive 
Office of United States Attorneys had just visited Cummins’ district and found it 
performing at a high level.45    
The Cummins case demonstrates the effect of the principle that as political 
appointees, the U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President and may be 
removed for any reason, including the President’s decision to appoint another 
person to the position.  It is also of interest because Kyle Sampson, the Attorney 
General’s Chief of Staff, recommended using new statutory authority to bypass the 
Senate confirmation process, appointing Griffin for an indefinite “interim” term 
that would continue for the last two years of the President’s term.46  Upon learning 
of continued opposition from Arkansas Senator David Pryor, Griffin withdrew 
from consideration for the permanent U.S. Attorney position.47  The process for 
appointing interim U.S. Attorneys during this period is discussed below. 
 
4. Carol Lam 
 
The forced resignation of Carol Lam, who served as U.S. Attorney for the 
Southern District of California, raised concern that she had been removed because 
of her aggressive pursuit of political corruption by Republican office holders and 
lobbyists.  Lam successfully prosecuted former Republican Congressman Randy 
“Duke” Cunningham and had announced plans to pursue the former Executive 
Director of the CIA in connection with the case.48  She had also begun an 
investigation of Republican Congressman Jerry Lewis following the disclosure that 
one of his staff aides became a lobbyist and arranged earmark contracts worth 
hundreds of millions.49 
                                                                                                                            
41  Id. at 115, 147. 
42  Id. at 136. 
43  Id. at 138. 
44  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 142–45. 
45  Id. at 126. 
46  See infra text accompanying notes 59–69. 
47  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 140. 
48  See John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 285–86 (2008). 
49  Editorial, Politics and the Corruption Fighter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A26. 
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Although critics noted that Kyle Sampson proposed Lam’s removal 
immediately after she announced plans to extend her investigation beyond 
Cunningham,50 the IG found “no evidence” that the prosecution or investigation of 
Republicans “had anything to do with” her removal.51  Instead, the IG concluded 
that Lam was removed because of her failure to adhere to the President’s and 
Department’s priorities by bringing an insufficient number of gun and immigration 
cases.52  The IG also found that in 2004, 2005, and 2006, members of Congress 
publicly criticized Lam’s record on immigration cases.53  Although some of the 
complaints came from individual members, in 2004 fourteen members wrote the 
Attorney General to criticize her office’s response to alien smuggling, and nineteen 
members wrote to the President a year later.54  The issue was also raised when the 
Attorney General testified in a House oversight hearing.55  Lam acknowledged to 
departmental officials that her numbers were lower than those of other border 
districts but attributed the difference to her policy of prosecuting a smaller number 
of more serious cases that required more resources and resulted in longer 
sentences.56 
Although attributing Lam’s dismissal to her failure to adhere to the 
Administration’s priorities, the report noted other “troubling” aspects of her case; 
despite the fact that Lam’s performance was otherwise exemplary, officials in 
Main Justice never seriously examined her explanations for the low number of 
prosecutions in her office, nor did they discuss with her the need to improve these 
statistics or face removal.57    
 
                                                                                                                            
50  The day after Lam’s announcement, Sampson wrote to White House Counsel about “[t]he 
real problem we have right now with Carol Lam that leads me to conclude that we should have 
someone ready to be nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires.”  E-mail from Kyle 
Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to William Kelley, Deputy Assistant to the President 
and Deputy Counsel (May 11, 2006), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/lam-
emails. 
51  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 285.  Indeed, the IG noted 
that “the investigation and prosecution of Cunningham and Foggo [the CIA official] were 
aggressively pursued by career prosecutors in Lam’s office, both during and after her tenure.”  Id. 
Sampson told Congress that the “problem” to which he referred in the e-mail was not related to 
the ongoing Cunningham matter.  U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on U.S. 
Attorney Firings, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007 (testimony of Kyle Sampson, in response to questions 
from Sen. Feinstein), http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/documents/sampson_transcript032907.html. 
52  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 272–73. 
53  Id. at 277. 
54  Id. at 277–78. 
55  Id. at 278. 
56  Id. at 281. 
57  Id. at 286 (noting that Lam’s office had received a positive EARS evaluation, and that she 
had been described by Associate Deputy Attorney General Margolis as “otherwise ‘outstanding,’ 
‘tough,’ and ‘honest’”). 
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Given the lack of notice to Lam of the seriousness of her failure to increase 
gun and immigration prosecutions, her high-profile prosecution of corrupt 
Republican office holders, and the timing of her forced removal, her case was 
seen—not without some justification—as an example of what would happen to 
U.S. Attorneys who failed to toe the line and be what some called “loyal Bushies.”  
Particularly in light of the Department’s failure to provide a coherent and credible 
account of the reason for the various dismissals, Lam’s removal created the 
appearance of improper partisan influence.   
Lam’s case also illustrates several other significant issues.  First, based upon 
the IG’s report, this was the clearest example of the removal of a U.S. Attorney as 
a means of enforcing the priorities of the President and the political leadership of 
the Department.  Lam’s replacement contributed to a more uniform national 
approach, but it did so by overriding a policy that was arguably tailored to meet the 
needs of an individual district.  The district’s statistics on immigration cases were 
low precisely because Lam had adopted a policy of devoting significant resources 
to immigration cases, but using them to bring a smaller number of more serious, 
resource-intensive cases.  Her removal can thus be seen as an example of the 
tension between uniform national policies and those tailored to individual districts.  
It is worth noting that the political leadership in the Department never seriously 
considered Lam’s approach or gave her an opportunity to make a case for it.58  
Finally, the Lam case demonstrates that in some cases, members of Congress, 
individually and collectively, take a keen interest in the activities of individual 
U.S. Attorneys. 
 
B. The Interim U.S. Attorney Loophole 
 
As noted above, Kyle Sampson proposed that Tim Griffin (the replacement 
for Bud Cummins) be nominated as interim U.S. Attorney and serve without 
Senate confirmation for the last two years of President Bush’s term.  Sampson 
sought to exploit an obscure provision, enacted in the March 2006 Patriot Act 
reauthorization regarding the appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys, to bypass 
Senate confirmation altogether.  Whereas previously, an interim U.S. Attorney 
selected by the Attorney General could only serve 120 days before the district 
court appointed an interim U.S. Attorney,59 the new provision provided that an 
interim appointed by the Attorney General could serve indefinitely, without 
nomination by the President or confirmation by the Senate.60  The legislation was 
                                                                                                                            
58  A summer intern was assigned to evaluate Lam’s approach but lacked the necessary 
expertise and failed to complete the assignment.  Id. at 282. 
59  The 120-day limit on the term of acting U.S. Attorneys was set in 1986.  See Criminal Law 
and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 69, 100 Stat. 3616-17 
(1986) (amended 2006).  Before that, 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1982) authorized the district court to fill a 
vacancy with an acting U.S. Attorney until the President appointed a person with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.     
60  See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 
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added quietly, with no discussion, to the bill at the Department’s request by a 
staffer on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Brett Tollman, who was himself later 
appointed U.S. Attorney in Utah.61 
In an e-mail, Kyle Sampson, the Attorney General’s chief of staff, stated that 
“I strongly recommend that as a matter of Administration policy, we utilize the 
new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to make appointments,” because by 
bypassing the confirmation process “we can give far less deference to home-state 
Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it faster and 
more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.”62  Referring to 
objections from the Arkansas senators, Sampson wrote “we should ‘gum this to 
death’ . . . and ‘run the clock’ while appearing to be acting in ‘good faith’ by 
asking the Senators for their recommendations, interviewing other candidates, and 
pledging to desire a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney.”63 
The Attorney General told the IG that he did not support Sampson’s plan to 
bypass the confirmation process, and the IG “did not find evidence” to the 
contrary.64  Although Sampson himself later sought to minimize his e-mails as just 
a bad idea at the staff level, the IG notes that Sampson advocated the plan, began 
to implement it, and abandoned it only after determined opposition from Senator 
Pryor as well as the controversy surrounding the U.S. Attorney firings.65  In fact, 
critics charge that the political leadership at the Department of Justice relied upon 
the Patriot Act authority to generate its own list of replacements for the fired U.S. 
Attorneys rather than deferring to the recommendations of home-state Senators, as 
is traditional, and that it relied upon this authority to appoint approximately twenty 
interim U.S. Attorneys.66  These interim U.S. Attorneys had less authority to hire 
career prosecutors for their offices than their presidentially appointed and 
senatorially confirmed peers.67  The Department’s White House Liaison, Monica 
Goodling, assumed the responsibility of hiring new Assistant United States 
Attorneys (AUSAs) in offices with interim U.S. Attorneys, and the IG found in a 
separate report that Goodling’s hiring decisions turned on partisan 
considerations.68 
                                                                                                                            
502, 120 Stat. 192 (2006). 
61  See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center 
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1391 (2008). 
62  IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 130. 
63  Id. at 133. 
64  Id. at 147. 
65  Id. at 146–47. 
66  James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice’s Centralization Efforts 
in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney 
Firings]. 
67  See id. at 256 n.113; IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at 
25–26. 
68  IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at 25–46.  See also 
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In the wake of the controversy over the firings, Congress restored the 120-day 
limit with the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, which 
President Bush signed on June 14, 2007.69 
Although the scheme to exploit the Patriot Act authority was short lived, it 
highlights the degree to which the requirement of Senate confirmation imposes real 
limitations on the president’s choices for the post of U.S. Attorney, forcing the 
president to take account of preferences in the Senate and especially those of 
home-state senators.  It also emphasizes another aspect of the normal independence 
of U.S. Attorneys, their ability to hire the AUSAs of their own choice, rather than 
candidates preferred by officials in Main Justice. 
 
C. Evidence of Partisan Influences on Prosecutorial Discretion  
 
The dismissals of U.S. Attorneys David Iglesias and Carol Lam, discussed 
above, show the danger that U.S. Attorneys may face explicit pressure to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion in a manner that advances partisan political goals, or may 
fear removal if their prosecutorial decisions do not in fact advance such goals.  
Although it appears that neither Iglesias nor Lam succumbed to such pressure, 
critics charge that in other instances prosecutorial discretion in the federal system 
has been tainted by partisan considerations.  These claims are the subject of an 
ongoing investigation by the House Committee on the Judiciary Committee.  The 
Committee has heard from critics of the administration, but the assertion of 
executive privilege has prevented the Committee from obtaining testimony and 
documentary evidence from past and present officials in the White House.70  The 
discussion below is based upon the October 2007 congressional hearing71 and the 
                                                                                                                            
Eisenstein, supra note 66, at 255–57 (describing Goodling’s hiring practices). 
69  See Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-34, § 3, 
121 Stat. 224 (2007).    
70  The Committee has subpoenaed Harriet Miers (former counsel to the president), Josh 
Bolton (the president’s chief of staff), and Karl Rove, all of whom have refused to appear on the 
grounds of executive privilege.  The House of Representatives voted to hold Miers and Bolton in 
contempt of Congress and passed a resolution authorizing litigation to enforce compliance with the 
subpoena.  See Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Harriet Miers and 
Joshua Bolton, Chief of Staff, White House, in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply With 
Subpoenas Duly Issued by the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Res. 110-423, 110th Cong. (2007), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ContemptReport071105.pdf.  See also 
Committee on the Judiciary v. Harriet Miers, 542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing action in 
Congress leading to litigation).  Although the district court ordered Miers and Bolton to comply with 
the subpoena, the court of appeals granted a stay pending appeal and denied the motion for 
expedition, indicating that it would be beneficial to have the views of a new President and new House 
of Representatives.  Id.  An agreement has reportedly been reached for Rove and Miers to give 
deposition testimony under oath.  See supra note 29. 
71  Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public Confidence in our Federal 
Justice System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter 
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution]. 
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report prepared by the Majority Staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary,72 
as well as other publicly available materials. 
The evidence presented by critics at congressional hearings and in related 
investigations falls into two categories: statistical evidence and evidence 
concerning individual prosecutions.  Since there has been no resolution of these 
charges, which remain under investigation, they stand on a different and weaker 
footing than the IG’s report. 
 
1. Statistical disparity 
 
Professor Donald Shields of the University of Missouri presented statistical 
data on political corruption investigations during the Bush Administration.  Shields 
testified to Congress in 2007 regarding an eight-year longitudinal study he 
conducted on, what he described as federal political profiling of federal, state, and 
local political officeholders.73  His study tracked more than 800 political corruption 
investigations led by U.S. Attorneys under Attorneys General Ashcroft and 
Gonzales.  Shields concluded that the disparity between investigations of 
Democrats versus Republicans was statistically significant beyond the .0001 
level.74  Although only fifty percent of elected officials in the United States 
reported being Democrats during the period in question, Shields found that eighty 
percent of those investigated by the Bush Administration were Democrats.75   
The Shields study has not been peer-reviewed and is subject to very 
significant limitations.  First, although Shields testified that his research 
demonstrates “political profiling” and “selective investigation and prosecution 
[rates],”76 he analyzed only the reports of investigations that appeared in national 
and local television and newspaper accounts or in federal press releases.77  Thus 
his study does not include investigations that were not publicized (or that escaped 
his search terms78), and it does not separate investigations that led to charges from 
                                                                                                                            
72  MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110th CONG., ALLEGATIONS OF 
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION IN OUR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Comm. Print 2008) 
(prepared for Chairman John Conyers, Jr.), available at http://www.folo.us/wp-
content/uploads/2008/04/house-judish-majority-staff-report.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE STAFF REPORT]. 
73  House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 226–70 (written 
statement by Prof. Donald Shields entitled “An Empirical Examination of the Political Profiling of 
Elected Officials: A Report on Selective Investigations and/or Indictments by the DOJ’s Attorneys 
under Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales”).  
74  Id. at 225 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 230 (written statement of Prof. Shields). 
75  Id. at 224 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 268 (table 2).  In comparison, forty-one percent 
were Republicans, and nine percent reported themselves to be Independent or Other.  Id. 
76  Id. at 225 (testimony of Prof. Shields). 
77  Id. at 224 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 228–29 (written statement of Prof. Shields, 
describing his project as a “political communication study” rather than a “legal study”). 
78  For a description of the search methodology and some of its limitations, see id. at 229–30 
(written statement of Prof. Shields). 
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those that did not.  Shields focused on press and news reports because there is no 
publicly available database of all federal investigations, but he also suggested that 
the pattern of prosecutions publicized by the Department is independently 
significant because of its political effects.79  Additionally, the Shields study seems 
to imply that U.S. Attorneys chose the subjects of their investigations, though they 
commonly rely upon referrals from investigating agencies, such as the F.B.I.80   
Although the Shields study is flawed, using a different methodology that 
avoids these problems, Sanford Gordon found evidence suggesting partisan bias in 
prosecutions in both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.81  Gordon’s study, 
though promising, is still a working paper. 
 
2. Individual prosecutions 
 
The House Judiciary Committee’s investigation into selective prosecution has 
focused principally on allegations of partisan motives in five individual 
prosecutions, though additional cases have also been referenced briefly.82  The two 
most prominent cases are those of Don Siegelman and Georgia Thompson. 
 
a. Don Siegelman 
 
The first prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman during the 
Bush administration ended on the second day of trial, when the court dismissed the 
case with prejudice.83  Siegelman was indicted in 2005 on new charges of federal 
                                                                                                                            
79  See id. at 228 (written statement of Prof. Shields, noting his project was originally intended 
to be a “political communication study” rather than a “legal study”).  However, it appears Shields 
himself now views the study in a different light.  He describes it as establishing the existence of 
selective prosecution and proposes remedies to address selective prosecution.  See id. at 234 (stating 
that the statistics establish “that federal investigations and/or indictments of local officials are highly 
disproportionate by political party” and that “this is clear proof of a political bias, a bias of selective 
investigation and prosecution”), 234–36 (proposing various procedural remedies). 
80  See Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Corruption Prosecutions 8  
(July 21, 2008) (unpublished working paper) (concluding that Shields study is flawed by this 
assumption, applying a methodology focusing on sentences in corruption cases, and finding evidence 
of partisan bias under both the Bush II and Clinton Justice Departments, though noting that results 
may understate extent of bias under Bush while overstating it under Clinton), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1166343. 
81  Id. at 33 (applying a methodology focusing on sentencing in corruption cases, and finding 
evidence of partisan bias under both the Bush II and Clinton Justice Departments). 
82  See HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 72, at 7–30 (describing in detail allegations 
concerning Don Siegelman, Georgia Thompson, Dr. Cyril Wecht, Justice Oliver Diaz, and Paul 
Minor), 30–33 (referring briefly to allegations concerning Senator Robert Menendez, Carl Marlinga, 
State Senator Vince Fumo, and State Senator Charles Walker); House Hearing on Allegations of 
Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 2–3 (materials concerning Minor and Diaz), 4–193 (materials 
concerning Siegelman), 209–24 (materials concerning Wecht), 195–205 (materials concerning Anibal 
Acevedo-Vilá, Senator Walker, Peter Palivos, and Geoffrey Fieger). 
83  Siegelman Fraud Case Dismissed, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, at 1A; Philip Rawls, 
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funds bribery, honest services mail fraud, obstruction of justice, Hobbs Act 
extortion under color of law, RICO violations, and related conspiracy charges.84  
Most of the charges were based on contributions made by Richard Scrushy, the 
former CEO of HealthSouth, to help fund a ballot initiative supported by 
Siegelman that would establish a state lottery to fund secondary education in 
Alabama.85  Scrushy provided two checks totaling $500,000 for this purpose to the 
Alabama Education Lottery Foundation.  The government charged that Siegelman 
reappointed Scrushy to the Alabama Certificate of Need Review Board in 
exchange for the contributions.  Siegelman was convicted on seven counts of mail 
fraud, federal program bribery, and obstruction, and sentenced to more than seven 
years imprisonment.86  The government had advocated a sentence of thirty years87 
and initially filed but later withdrew a cross appeal to challenge Siegelman’s 
sentence as too lenient.88  Immediately following sentencing, Siegelman was taken 
from the courtroom in handcuffs and leg irons to begin serving his sentence.89  
Although the Eleventh Circuit ordered Siegelman’s release on bail pending the 
completion of his appeal, it subsequently affirmed his conviction on five of the 
seven counts.90 
 
                                                                                                                            
Hearing on Evidence Was Turning Point, MOBILE REG., Oct. 10, 2004, at B2. 
84  See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Siegelman, No. 2:05-CR-119-F (M.D. 
Ala. Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.al.com/mobileregister/DecemberIndictment.pdf.  
Siegelman is charged in counts 1–3, 5–14, 16–17, and 34. 
85  Compare Brief for the Appellee at 3, 5–18, United States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B 
(11th Cir.) [hereinafter U.S. Brief in Siegelman] available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/govt_brief.pdf (describing evidence 
concerning Scrushy’s delivery of checks to Siegelman), with Brief for Appellant at 6–14, United 
States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B (11th Cir. May 2008) [hereinafter Siegelman brief], available 
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/seigelman_final_brief.pdf. 
86  U.S. Brief in Siegelman, supra note 85, at 3–4 (detailing counts of conviction and sentence 
of eighty-eight months imprisonment).  Siegelman was acquitted of the remaining twenty-five counts. 
87  House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 9 (Statement of 
Louis V. Franklin, Sr., Acting U.S. Attorney) (noting guideline calculation leading to guideline level 
of 42, with a range of 360 months to life). 
88  Kim Chandler, Prosecutors Quit Seeking Longer Terms For Siegelman, Scrushy, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 5, 2008, at 6B, available at 2008 WLNR 10716488 (reporting that the 
Government filed a motion withdrawing its appeal of the sentences as too lenient). 
89  Id. 
90  United States v. Siegelman, No. 0713163, 2009 WL 564659, at *6–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 
2009).  See Editorial, Freedom for Siegelman, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 30, 2008, at 2, available at 
2008 WLNR 6137779 (reporting that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had ordered Siegelman’s 
release on bail pending appeal nine months after he began serving his sentence and noting that the 
standard for release on appeal was that the appeal raised “substantial questions of fact or law likely to 
result in reversal or an order for a new trial”).  See also Editorial, A Political Prosecution?, NAT’L 
L.J., April 14, 2008, at 23 (noting a variety of circumstances about the case that raise “red flags” and 
concluding that the court of appeals “seems justified” in granting Siegelman’s release pending 
appeal).  
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The criticism of the Siegelman prosecution generally focuses on two related 
concerns: a claim that Siegelman was targeted by the Bush White House and U.S. 
Attorney’s Office because he was a successful Democratic politician,91 and a 
concern that the theory upon which the case was prosecuted is so broad that it 
“would mean that a prosecutor has the power to indict and convict any politician 
and any donor whenever a donation was made and the politician took an action 
consistent with the donor’s desire.”92 
Much of the criticism of the Siegelman prosecution rests on allegations that 
the decision to prosecute Siegelman was improperly influenced by senior White 
House adviser Karl Rove, working in tandem with the U.S. Attorneys in Alabama, 
especially U.S. Attorney Leura Canary, whose husband worked on the campaign of 
Siegelman’s opponent in the 2002 gubernatorial election.  A participant in a call 
involving U.S. Attorney Canary’s husband has stated under oath that Mr. Canary 
assured the participants in the call that they need not worry about Siegelman 
contesting the very close gubernatorial election, because the two U.S. Attorneys 
“could take care of Siegelman,” and Karl Rove had arranged matters with the 
Justice Department, which was “already pursuing Siegelman.”93  U.S. Attorney 
Canary denies these charges, as do other participants in the call.94  Karl Rove 
refused to testify before the House Judiciary Committee on July 10, 2008, about 
his potential involvement in the Siegelman prosecution or U.S. Attorney firings.95  
Related to this main claim are charges that Siegelman has been treated more 
harshly than other similarly situated defendants.96 
                                                                                                                            
91  Siegelman was narrowly defeated in the gubernatorial election in 2002 after a controversy 
about the final vote count.  See Steve McConnell, The Changing of the Guards: Bay Minette, Election 
Night, BALDWIN COUNTY NOW, July 20, 2007, 
http://baldwincountynow.com/articles/2007/07/25/local_news/doc469fbb5bd2a7f444039407.txt. 
92  Brief in Support of Appellant as Amici Curiae Former Attorneys General at 10, United 
States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B (11th Cir. May 30, 2008) [hereinafter Attorneys General 
Amicus Brief in Siegelman]. 
93  House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 168–93 (Jill 
Simpson affidavit and supporting documentary evidence), 21–163 (Jill Simpson statement under 
oath).  
94  Ms. Canary publicly recused herself from the case, which was prosecuted by a career 
attorney in her office.  See House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 
5–9.  The other participants, Rob Riley, Bill Canary, and Terry Butts all deny Simpson’s allegations.  
Id. at 11–13 (affidavit of Robert Riley), 14–16 (affidavit of Matthew Lembke), 17–19 (affidavit of 
Terry Butts).   
95  See Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, to Members of the Committee on the 
Judiciary (July 29, 2008) (recounting background of investigation, efforts to secure Rove’s voluntary 
testimony, subpoena to Rove, and Rove’s refusal to appear), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/RoveMemo080730.pdf.  See also RULING OF CHAIRWOMAN 
LINDA SÁNCHEZ ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE-RELATED IMMUNITY CLAIMS BY KARL ROVE (2008), 
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/PDFs/Sanchez080710.pdf. An agreement has reportedly 
been reached for Rove to give deposition testimony under oath.  See supra note 29.  
96  For example, another former Alabama governor was convicted of corruption charges in a 
case where he had personally benefitted, but he received a sentence of probation.  House Hearing on 
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The Siegelman prosecution has been the subject of widespread criticism.  A 
bipartisan group of forty-four former state attorneys general wrote to the House 
and Senate Judiciary committees requesting a full investigation of the case,97 
stating that “there is reason to believe that the case brought against Governor 
Siegelman may have had sufficient irregularities as to call into question the basic 
fairness that is the linchpin of our system of justice.”98  The case has been the 
subject of exposés in media outlets ranging from CBS’s 60 Minutes99 to national 
newspapers,100 and other popular periodicals including Time magazine101 and 
Harper’s.102  The prosecution is also under investigation not only by Congress but 
also by the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility.103 
Although the main focus of concern has been on allegations that the 
Siegelman prosecution was politically motivated and orchestrated by Karl Rove 
and others, a second closely related concern has been raised most pointedly by a 
bipartisan group of more than 50 former state attorneys general.  In their amicus 
                                                                                                                            
Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 292. 
97  Id. at 290–93 (reprinting letter).  See also Kim Chandler, House Panel to Probe Role of 
Politics, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 18, 2007, at A1. 
98  House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 291. 
99  See 60 Minutes: Did Ex-Alabama Governor Get A Raw Deal? (CBS television broadcast 
Feb. 21, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/21/60minutes/main3859830.shtml. 
100 See, e.g., Tom Hamburger, Panels Urged to Probe Ex-Gov.’s Prosecution: Forty-four 
Former State Attorneys General Ask Congress to Examine the Federal Case Against an Alabama 
Democrat, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at A8; Adam Nossiter, Democrats See Politics in a Governor’s 
Jailing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at A1; Adam Nossiter, Freed Ex-Governor of Alabama Talks of 
Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at A13; Adam Nossiter, Where Politics Meet a Federal 
Prosecution Investigating Case Against Ex-Governor, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 12, 2007, at 4, 
available at 2007 WLNR 17821613; Politics Behind Ex-Governor’s Prosecution?, SEATTLE TIMES, 
July 17, 2007, at A10; Probe Sought in Federal Prosecution: Politics at the Justice Department Are 
Alleged In Case of Former Gov. Siegelman, HOUS. CHRON., July 17, 2007, at A5; Questions About a 
Governor’s Fall, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A16. 
101 Adam Zagorin, A Case of Selective Justice, TIME, Oct. 4, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1668453,00.html; Adam Zagorin, Rove Named in 
Alabama Controversy, TIME, June 1, 2007, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1627427,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar. 
102 Scott Horton, Vote Machine: How the Republicans Hacked the Justice Department, 
HARPER’S MAG., March 2008, at 37, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/03/0081943. 
103 See Letter from H. Marshall Jarrett, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility 
(OPR), to John Conyers, Jr., Chairman (May 5, 2008) (stating that OPR “currently has pending 
investigations involving, among others, allegations of selective prosecution relating to the 
prosecutions of Don Siegelman, Georgia Thompson, Oliver Diaz and Paul Minor”), available at 
http://alt.cimedia.com/ajc/pdf/polinsider/050508%20response%20to%20report%20r.pdf; Carrie 
Johnson, House Panel Subpoenas Rove over Role in Justice Dept. Actions, WASH. POST, May 23, 
2008, at A10 (stating House Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers “disclosed yesterday that 
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility has opened an investigation of 
possible selective prosecution of Siegelman and at least three others, at the request of the House 
Judiciary panel”). 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:369 
 
388
brief in support of Siegelman’s appeal the former attorneys general express 
concern that his prosecution was founded on a dangerously overbroad 
interpretation of the mail/wire fraud and federal program bribery statutes that 
“would have strong repercussions” going far beyond the particular case.104  The 
court of appeals took a different view of the case, concluding that the district court 
had correctly required a quid pro quo—though not an “express” quid pro quo—
and that the testimony of one of Siegelman’s former aides was sufficient to 
establish such a quid pro quo for five of the seven counts on which he was 
convicted.105  
These claims are, of course, related, since interpreting the mail and wire fraud 
statutes more broadly, without a requirement of an explicit quid pro quo, greatly 
enhances the range of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and hence the 
danger that this discretion might be wielded in a partisan fashion. 
 
b. Georgia Thompson 
 
Georgia Thompson, a state procurement officer in Wisconsin, was convicted 
of mail fraud and federal program bribery as a result of making slight deviations 
from the procedures in state administrative code and awarding a contract to the low 
bidder.106  Thompson was a civil service employee appointed during the 
administration of the previous Republican governor.107  Although the winning 
bidder had made campaign contributions to the Democratic governor, there was no 
                                                                                                                            
104 Attorneys General Amicus Brief in Siegelman, supra note 92, at 10.  As explained in their 
brief: 
Allowing a conviction under either bribery or “honest services” statutes without an 
explicit quid pro quo requirement . . . puts at risk every politician who accepts a 
campaign contribution in the knowledge that the donor hopes to influence the politician, 
and every donor who contributes to a campaign with the hope or expectation of receiving 
a benefit who goes on to receive that benefit.  Such an interpretation of the statutes, 
criminalizing activities that fall far short of an explicit quid pro quo agreement, can only 
lead to an impermissible chilling effect on the First Amendment right to contribute to 
political campaigns. 
Id. 
105 United States v. Siegelman, No. 0713163, 2009 WL 564659, at *6–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 6, 
2009). 
106 United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2007).  Although the company that 
ultimately received the contract had the highest combined score for price and service, an out-of-state 
company scored very high on a “dog and pony show” presentation and had the highest combined 
score.  Id.  After seeking to get her colleagues to change their ratings, Thompson employed a state 
procedure allowing a “best-and-final” rebid, which led to scores of 1026.6 and 1027.3.  Id. at 879.  
With her supervisor’s consent, Thompson declared this a tie and awarded the contract to the in-state 
bidder.  Id.  Although it is not clear precisely which provision of state law it contended had been 
violated, the government’s theory was that “Thompson deflected the decision from the one that 
should have been made under the administrative process.”  Id. at 880. 
107 Adam Cohen, A Woman Wrongly Convicted and a U.S. Attorney Who Kept His Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at A18. 
2009] RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS  
 
389 
evidence that Thompson knew of the contribution and no claim that she received 
any benefit other than a $1,000 raise as part of her normal civil service review.108  
At oral argument, Judge Diane Wood told the prosecutor the government’s 
“evidence is beyond thin.”109  In an extremely unusual procedure, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed Thompson’s conviction from the bench, declaring her “innocent” 
and ordering her immediate release from prison.110  In a later opinion, the appellate 
court concluded that the record at trial was fully consistent with innocent reasons 
for Thompson’s support of the low bidder, including reducing costs and awarding 
the contract to an in-state company.111  The court emphasized the danger in treating 
any deviation from state laws or regulations as a federal crime, particularly in the 
absence of any evidence that the employee in question received any kickback or 
private gain, other than a raise awarded through the normal civil service process.112  
The court concluded with the comment that Congress might wish to reconsider the 
desirability of the wide-open language of the federal program bribery statute and 
the “honest services” prong of the mail fraud statute: 
 
Courts can curtail some effects of statutory ambiguity but cannot deal 
with the source.  This prosecution, which led to the conviction and 
imprisonment of a civil servant for conduct that, as far as this record 
shows, was designed to pursue the public interest as the employee 
understood it, may well induce Congress to take another look at the 
wisdom of enacting ambulatory criminal prohibitions.  Haziness 
designed to avoid loopholes through which bad persons can wriggle can 
impose high costs on people the statute was not designed to catch.113 
 
Critics charge that Thompson’s prosecution was intended to provide a boost 
to Republicans in hotly contested state elections.  They allege that during the run 
up to the 2006 gubernatorial campaign, the U.S. Attorney revealed the 
investigation to the media despite Departmental norms against disclosure prior to 
the filing of formal charges, and that Thompson’s trial and conviction then became 
a major issue during the campaign.114  The Republican candidate ran a barrage of 
                                                                                                                            
108 Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879. 
109 Jason Stein, Experts Say Ruling Hits Prosecutor’s Credibility, Court Makes It Clear That 
U.S. Attorney Must Bring Much Stronger Cases in Fundraising Probes, WIS. STATE J., April 8, 2007, 
http://www.madison.com/wsj/home/local/index.php?ntid=128460&ntpid=2 (quoting Judge Wood). 
110 Id. (quoting former U.S. Attorney who could not recall any other case in four decades in 
which Seventh Circuit had reversed from the bench and ordered the defendant released immediately). 
111 The appellate court recognized there had been testimony that Thompson referred to 
“political reasons” for the selection, but the court concluded this might have meant no more than 
political pressure to keep costs down or award the contract to an in-state company.  Thompson, 484 
F.3d at 879–80.  
112 Id. at 882–84. 
113 Id. at 884. 
114 Cohen, supra note 107, at A18. 
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ads linking Thompson to Governor Jim Doyle, the incumbent Democrat.  (One ad 
showed Thompson’s photo stamped “guilty,” and another displayed her name on a 
jail cell slamming shut.)115  The state Democratic Party Chair said that the 
Thompson case became the number one issue in the governor’s race.  Before and 
after Thompson’s trial, prosecutors offered her generous plea concessions in 
exchange for information and testimony against Governor Doyle or other 
Democratic officials.116  Bush administration critics noted that Wisconsin was a 
swing state, which Bush lost narrowly in 2000 and 2004, and that Karl Rove was 
said to have identified it as the highest priority among the governor’s races in 
2006.117 
Some observers also suggested that there might be a link between the 
Thompson prosecution and the firing of other U.S. Attorneys, because Steven 
Biskupic, the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Thompson, was on an early list of 
those proposed for dismissal.118  The IG found that Biskupic’s name was on the 
first list of U.S. Attorneys to be considered for removal in 2005 but was not 
included in any of the lists in 2006.119  The concern, of course, is that U.S. 
Attorneys whose jobs are on the line may face implicit or explicit pressure to use 
their office to please their political superiors.  Kyle Sampson, who compiled this 
list, told the IG that he did not recall why he listed Biskupic, but he believed 
Biskupic was removed from later lists to avoid the ire of Wisconsin Congressman 
James Sensenbrenner.120  Biskupic told the IG that he was unaware that he was 
ever considered for removal, and he denied discussing the Thompson case with 
superiors at the Department.121  Similarly, Sampson said that other U.S. Attorneys 
who might otherwise have been dismissed were left in office because the 
Department wished to avoid a confrontation with their home-state senators.122 
                                                                                                                            
115 Id. 
116 Ryan J. Foley, Doyle Rips Deal in Travel Case; Leniency Offered for Testimony, CAP. 
TIMES (Madison, WI), May 18, 2007, at C2, available at 2007 WLNR 9441643 (noting that 
Thompson was offered the opportunity before trial to plead to two misdemeanors and avoid jail, that 
she repeatedly rejected such offers on the ground that she had no information about wrongdoing by 
her superiors, and that prosecutors repeated their offers after trial, implicitly asking her to contradict 
the testimony she had given under oath). 
117 Cohen, supra note 107, at A18. 
118 See, e.g., id. (noting Biskupic’s argument that Thompson sought to please her superiors and 
enhance her job security might describe his motivation for prosecuting her); Editorial, Another Layer 
of Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A16 (advocating Congressional investigation to determine 
what Biskupic and other U.S. Attorneys did to escape being dismissed); Dan Eggen, Gonzales 
Remains at Center of U.S. Attorneys Controversy, WASH. POST, April 18, 2007, available at 2007 
WLNR 7340745 (noting connection between controversy over U.S. Attorney firings and Biskupic, 
Republican complaints to the White House regarding Biskupic’s failure to prosecute voter fraud, and 
Biskupic’s role in the prosecution of Georgia Thompson).  
119 IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 18–20 & n.19. 
120 Id. at 20 n.19. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 45 (Paula Silsby (District of Maine) and Thomas Marino (Middle District of 
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEY 
 
The Department’s unusual structure—its exceptionally large number of 
presidential appointees in regional offices—is rooted in its history.  The Judiciary 
Act of 1789 gave the authority to enforce federal law to the new federal judicial 
districts, which generally coincided with the states.  The attorney general was not 
given supervisory authority over the new federal attorneys in each district, though 
he played a role in a few prosecutions with national implications.  This original 
structure remains in place, but the attorney general has been given supervisory 
authority over U.S. Attorneys, and more importantly the district-oriented structure 
has been gradually supplemented by a second level of authority organized under 
the attorney general.  The Justice Department now includes subdivisions, 
themselves headed by presidential appointees, which have responsibility for the 
administration of criminal law.  And the Department has promulgated an 
increasing number of standards and regulations for federal prosecution.  The 
current organization of the Department is thus a hybrid, with the original district-
oriented authority coinciding with the central authority wielded by the attorney 
general and the attorneys housed in Main Justice, who work under the supervision 
of the Department’s political leadership. 
By the middle of the Twentieth Century, the attorney general had not only the 
legal authority to exercise general supervision over the U.S. Attorneys, but also the 
practical prerequisites of sufficient personnel as well as the means necessary to 
keep appraised of developments in the field.  In the past half century there has been 
a significant centralization of authority.  A variety of initiatives have been adopted 
to regulate prosecutorial discretion at the national level for the stated purpose of 
promoting consistency and avoiding abuse.  These initiatives have considerably 
reduced the autonomy of individual U.S. Attorneys.  But the movement toward 
centralization and uniformity has not wholly displaced the U.S. Attorneys, who 
continue to wield considerable authority.  The preservation of the authority of the 
U.S. Attorneys owes something to the weight of tradition and the determined 
resistance of current and past U.S. Attorneys.  But it also reflects a more general 
recognition that the dispersal of authority has continuing value in the federal 
system.  Congress has had its thumb on both sides of the scale, sometimes 
acquiescing in and supporting decentralization and independence in the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, but in other instances pressing for uniformity, particularly with 
respect to sentencing practices.  During some periods, Congress has been 
extremely skeptical of Main Justice.  Practical factors have also played a role.  The 
development of the central authority in Main Justice has been offset, to a degree, 
by changes in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, which now have larger staffs including 
more experienced attorneys.  
 
                                                                                                                            
Pennsylvania) were deleted from the list for removal because they had the strong support of their 
home-state senators and the administration did not want to risk a fight regarding their removal). 
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The modern era has also been characterized by fundamental changes in the 
nature of the federal criminal justice system that magnify the importance of 
prosecutorial discretion.  The system has expanded to a degree that would be 
unimaginable to the founders.  There are now more than 4,000 federal offenses, 
and federal law now occupies much of the same ground as state law.  Because the 
scope of federal law is so broad, federal prosecutors can charge only a tiny fraction 
of the offenses, and they necessarily exercise discretion in selecting those cases.  
Moreover, some of the key federal offenses are themselves broad and amorphous, 
giving federal prosecutors another form of discretion that is especially significant 
in cases involving allegations of political corruption at the state and local level.  
These cases now fall within the expanded federal system.  Finally, because fewer 
than five percent of the cases go to trial, in most cases that end with a guilty plea 
there is no external check on the prosecutor’s discretion.  Federal prosecution has 
been transformed into an administrative system. 
Despite the many changes that have occurred in the role of the U.S. Attorneys 
and the makeup of the federal criminal justice system, there has been little change 
in the patterns of the appointment and removal of U.S. Attorneys.  This stability 
reflects the fact that the traditional system creates valuable patronage opportunities 
and increases the influence of both the president and the Senate, and it has 
generally been deemed to be working successfully. 
 
A. Autonomy During the Founding Period 
 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal district courts and the 
positions of the judge, marshal, and attorney for the United States in each of the 
new districts, as well as the position of attorney general.123  Like the attorney 
general, the new federal attorneys and marshals in each district were appointed by 
the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.124  This structure reflected 
a respect for the states as distinct communities.  The districts coincided with state 
boundaries except for separate districts in the portions of Massachusetts and 
                                                                                                                            
123 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2 (creating federal judicial districts), § 3 (creating district 
court in each district to consist of judge who shall reside in the district), § 27 (providing for 
appointment of marshal in each district who shall serve for term of four years but be removable from 
office at pleasure of president), § 35 (providing for appointment in each district of an attorney for the 
United States as well as “attorney-general for the United States”), 1 Stat. 73, 87, 92 (1789).  For 
many years the attorneys representing the United States in each district were generally referred to as 
“district attorneys,” though that phrase does not appear in the Act.  For purposes of this article, I will 
generally use the contemporary phrase U.S. Attorney(s). 
124 Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not expressly identify the appointing authority, it 
was and has been treated as referring the president’s power to appoint inferior officers under Article 
II.  See Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 247, 
248–49 (1993) (“In the absence of any congressional enactment on the subject, the existing 
appointment process functions directly under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides 
that the President shall nominate and, with the ‘advice and consent’ of the Senate, appoint inferior 
officers.”). 
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Virginia that would later become the new states of Maine and Kentucky.125  This 
structure was consistent with the founders’ concern for ensuring that a person 
charged with a crime should be tried in the district where the crime was committed 
by a jury drawn by the residents of that district.126 
The first Congress declined to give the attorney general the authority to 
supervise the U.S. Attorneys,127 and it made them financially independent of the 
central government.  Their compensation was to be based upon “such fees as shall 
be taxed therefore in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions 
shall be.”128  However, during the first eighty years, some institutional authority 
over the U.S. Attorneys rested with various federal agencies, including the 
Departments of State129 and Treasury,130 which had an interest, for example, in the 
collection of revenues. 
During this period, the attorney general did not closely supervise the actions 
of the federal attorneys in each district, although he supervised and even appeared 
in a few criminal cases of great national significance.131  Indeed, a leading scholar 
                                                                                                                            
125 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2 (creating federal judicial districts). 
126 Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making 
of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1205 (1977) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and 
amend. VI). 
127 Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: 
In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–89 (1989) (noting that the first 
Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, sought statutory authority to manage federal prosecutions with 
the backing of President Washington, but Congress refused even to require district attorneys to notify 
the Attorney General about litigation). 
128 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92–93 (1789).  In contrast, the attorney general’s 
compensation was to “be by law provided,” i.e., set by Congress.  Id. 
129 See Bloch, supra note 127, at 585–86 (“Indeed, many observers believed that Secretary of 
State Jefferson had more control over the district attorneys than Attorney General Randolph had.”); 
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38 
AM. U. L. REV. 275, 287 (1989) (“During President Washington’s administration, the Secretary of 
State evidently assumed titular responsibility for supervising the district attorneys, although that 
supervision was lax.”).  
130 Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, § 5, 4 Stat. 415 (1830) (authorizing the Solicitor of the 
Treasury “to instruct the district attorneys . . . in all matters and proceedings, appertaining to suits in 
which the United States is a party, or interested, and cause them . . . to report to him from time to 
time, any information he may require in relation to the same.”).  One knowledgeable observer also 
states that “in the early days,” when there was no centralized control, the federal district attorneys and 
marshals “were chiefly directed by the district judges, who themselves were subject to few rules of 
procedure and ran their courts pretty much as they pleased.”  LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE 65 (1967). 
131 In the early 1790s the attorney general participated actively in a test case charging a U.S. 
citizen who had aided French privateers with violating the neutrality laws and in the prosecution of 
cases arising out of the Whiskey Rebellion.  HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE 30–31, 43–45 (1937) (describing Attorney General Randoph’s attendance at circuit court to 
secure initial indictments, the use of the military to put down the rebellion after efforts at conciliation 
failed, and the trial of the resulting cases by the attorney general and the federal district attorney).  In 
both cases, the attorney general and the federal district attorney tried the cases together.  Indeed, in 
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has concluded that Congress deliberately “withheld the means necessary to enable 
the Executive to coordinate effective control over criminal law enforcement.”132  
Until the Civil War, the Attorney General’s office was “basically a one-man 
operation.”133  In 1817, for example, the new attorney general found that he had no 
office in Washington, no clerical assistance, and there were virtually no files or 
other records from his predecessors, many of whom resided outside of Washington 
and discharged their official duties by mail.134  Until 1850, Congress provided the 
Attorney General with only one clerk.135  The first full time attorney general, and 
the first to reside full time in Washington, took office in 1853.136  In any event, 
even if the Attorney General had been given more resources, it would have been 
impossible to provide close supervision because there were no quick means of 
travel to or communication with the U.S. Attorneys, who were dispersed 
throughout the nation.  The circumstances thus required the U.S. Attorneys in each 
district to act with a great deal of independence.  
There were, however, two countervailing factors that constrained the range of 
discretion the U.S. Attorneys exercised in criminal cases.  First, during this period 
the new federal government was small and the number of federal crimes very 
restricted, generally focusing on direct interference with federal programs, 
property, or officials.137  Second, the Supreme Court limited federal prosecutors to 
 
                                                                                                                            
rare circumstances early presidents issued orders to their district attorneys.  For example, George 
Washington encouraged prosecutions of tax dissenters during the Whiskey Rebellion in 1792.  See 
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553–63 (2005) (citing 
Proclamation of Sept. 15, 1792, in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 150–51 (John C. 
Fitzpatrick ed., United States Government Printing Press 1931)), for discussion of the involvement of 
Presidents George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson in prosecutions by federal 
district attorneys. 
132 Krent, supra note 129, at 289. 
133 JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL 
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 10 (1978). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A REPORT 
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AGENCIES 33 (1976) [hereinafter PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE]. 
137 For brief accounts of the early scope of federal criminal jurisdiction, see LISA L. MILLER, 
THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL 30–32 (2008), 
and Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIME & JUST. 694, 694–95 
(2nd ed. 2002).  
The principal antebellum federal crimes were (1) acts threatening the existence of the 
central government, such as treason; (2) misconduct by federal officers, such as 
acceptance of a bribe; (3) interference with the operation of the federal courts, such as 
perjury; and (4) interference with other governmental programs, including obstruction of 
the mails, theft of government property, revenue fraud, and bribery or obstruction of 
government personnel. 
Id. at 695. 
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the small number of crimes enacted by Congress, holding that there are no federal 
common law offenses.138 
 
B. Supervisory Authority and the Creation of the Department 
 
By the time of the Civil War, Congress was receptive to placing greater 
authority and resources in the attorney general, balancing the authority given to the 
federal attorneys in each district with central authority.  Although both Congress 
and the Attorney General made structural changes affecting the U.S. Attorneys 
immediately before and after the Civil War, the effect of these changes was limited 
for many years by practical constraints.   
The Attorney General was first given supervisory authority over the U.S. 
Attorneys in 1861,139 and in 1870 Congress created the Department of Justice and 
incorporated the U.S. Attorneys into the new department.140  The 1870 legislation 
granted the Attorney General “supervision of the conduct and proceedings of the 
various attorneys for the United States” and required the new U.S. Attorneys to 
make reports on their activities.141  Many departments had secured their own 
solicitors, and many special counsel had been appointed to conduct individual 
cases.  The creation of the department was intended to reduce expenditures by 
bringing these functions together under the supervision of the attorney general.142  
In order to bring to light any irregular practices, fraud, or abuse, the attorney 
general employed “examiners” to investigate the accounts and the conduct of cases 
by the federal district attorneys, and some cases of neglect of duty were 
reported.143 
The effect of the new statutory authority, however, was limited for many 
years by both the practical constraints imposed by geography as well as the 
tradition of U.S. Attorney autonomy.144  Writing of the period immediately before 
and after the Civil War, Attorney General Homer Cummings stated that the U.S. 
Attorneys “remained all but completely independent.”145  James Eisenstein notes 
                                                                                                                            
138 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32, 34 (1812). 
139 Act of August 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285 (1861) (granting the Attorney General 
“general superintendence and direction of the attorneys and marshals of all the districts in the United 
States and the Territories as to the manner of discharging their respective duties”). 
140 Department of Justice Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870). 
141 Id. § 16. 
142 LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1968).  See also 
CUMMINGS &  MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218–25. 
143 CUMMINGS &  MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 248.  See id. at 493–94 (noting severe 
problems caused by the fee system, which created very undesirable incentives). 
144 Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 248 (noting that “[t]he tradition of U.S. Attorney 
autonomy had become deeply entrenched before 1870” and attributing part of this entrenched 
autonomy to American geography and “the remoteness from Washington of the ninety-four U.S. 
Attorneys”). 
145 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218. 
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that during this period “[t]he attorney general had little time for supervision of U.S. 
Attorneys, and some felt it was improper for him to attempt it.”146  On the other 
hand, various attorneys general did instruct the U.S. Attorneys in some high 
priority cases,147 including the prosecution of violence in the South during the 
Reconstruction era.148 
In 1910, the Attorney General created a new internal organizational structure 
for the Department, assigning Assistant Attorneys General to head departments 
with responsibility for different fields of public law.149  These divisions were 
complemented by other units whose function was defined not by subject matter but 
by the stage or function of the process.150  This structure made it possible for the 
                                                                                                                            
146 EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 235 n.36.  Former Attorney General Cummings described 
the situation as follows: 
President Pierce had attempted to route departmental law business through the Attorney 
General, but even then, when called upon, the Attorney General acted merely as an 
adviser.  Black, who succeeded Cushing, believed it wrong to “interfere” with the 
management of cases in the trial courts and repeatedly refused requests, though he 
acknowledged a “sort of supervisory power” over the general subject.  Attorney General 
Bates denied himself all authority or responsibility for such cases. 
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218.  Cushing and Black served from 1853–57 and 
1857–60, respectively, which was before the enactment of the statutory authority for supervision.  
HUSTON, supra note 130, at 252; CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131.  Bates, who served from 
1861–64, held office after the enactment of the initial supervisory legislation.  Id.  
147 For example, the attorney general prepared lengthy instructions for the new U.S. Attorney 
for the Utah territory concerning the prosecution of Mormon polygamy.  CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, 
supra note 131, at 253.  The largely unsuccessful investigation and prosecution of fraud concerning 
the contracts for delivery of mail on “star routes” in sparsely settled areas of the West was 
orchestrated by the attorney general and postmaster general and then carried out by special counsel 
selected by them with some participation by the attorney general.  Id. at 253–60 (noting that the 
original counsel selected by the attorney general and postmaster general included a former federal 
district attorney from New York, and that the attorney general followed the first prosecution very 
closely and presented the closing argument himself). 
148 The attorney general was involved in some of the criminal prosecutions arising out of 
violence in southern states during the Reconstruction period.  Local U.S. Attorneys called upon the 
attorney general and other officials in Washington to provide military assistance to quell violence or 
maintain order, and to provide more resources to support prosecutions.  See, e.g., id. at 235 (request 
for federal troops and funds to hire special counsel).  The attorney general responded to these 
enquiries, and in some cases also provided specific instructions to the U.S. Attorneys regarding the 
actions to be taken in particular prosecutions.  See, e.g., id. at 237 (attorney general instructs federal 
district attorney in North Carolina to resist efforts to have judgments suspended in prosecution of Ku 
Klux Klan members), id. at 238 (attorney general directs dismissal of all charges in N.C. except “high 
crime” over protest of district attorney), id. at 240 (warning U.S. Attorney in South Carolina, who 
had 1,000 cases pending, that this could not continue because of the expense), id. at 241–45 (after 
Colfax Massacre in Louisiana, the Department sent an investigator to develop facts that led to 
indictment of ninety-six persons, and later after Justice Bradley, while riding circuit, granted motion 
in arrest of judgment based on narrow reading of the act, attorney general agreed prosecutions should 
be suspended until Supreme Court ruled on theory underlying most of the civil rights prosecutions). 
149 Id. at 496–97.   
150 Id.  For example, the Solicitor General was given responsibility for all government interests 
in the Supreme Court as well as control over all the decision whether to appeal in the lower courts.  
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Department to deal more efficiently with the growth in the number and complexity 
of legal issues arising under federal law. 
The Criminal Division was established in 1928 to supervise the administration 
of federal criminal law.151  In 1933, Attorney General Cummings assigned thirty-
one functions to the Criminal Division, including responsibility for the federal 
prohibition laws.152  The new structure did not, however, displace the U.S. 
Attorneys who continued to be responsible for litigation in their districts.153  Upon 
occasion, however, the Division was given a more active role.  For example, the 
Attorney General created a special unit during World War II to deal with war-
related frauds against the government, which functioned through a central office 
and field office within the Criminal Division.154 
 
C. The Modern Era 
 
The advent of modern communication and transportation eventually removed 
many of the practical barriers to controlling the widely dispersed and locally-
oriented U.S. Attorneys, thus paving the way for a reconsideration of the issue of 
the optimal distribution of federal law enforcement authority.  This period has been 
characterized by a movement toward centralized authority and greater uniformity 
that has coincided uneasily with a continued recognition of the traditional authority 
of the U.S. Attorneys.  
This shift in the balance between centralized and locally based authority has 
been taking place during a time of fundamental changes in the nature of the federal 
criminal justice system that magnify the importance of prosecutorial discretion.  As 
discussed in greater degree below, the extraordinary expansion in the scope of 
federal criminal law now requires federal prosecutors to exercise discretion in 
determining which of many possible cases to bring, and it gives them an 
unprecedented ability to reach allegations of political corruption at the state and 
local level.  New sentencing laws have also given federal prosecutors increased 
leverage in plea negotiations, and judicial oversight has been radically reduced 
because the vast majority of cases now end in a plea.  In effect, federal prosecution 
has been transformed into an administrative system, and federal prosecutors wield 
tremendous discretion within that system. 
                                                                                                                            
Id. at 497. 
151 HUSTON, supra note 130, at 188–89.   
152 Id. at 190–91. 
153 The Criminal Division did not displace the U.S. Attorneys but was given the responsibility 
of “supervision,” which involved some counseling and advising them.  See, e.g., 1942 ATTORNEY 
GENERAL ANNUAL REPORT 90 (recognizing that the U.S. Attorney has the “primary responsibility . . . 
for the proper administration of the law in his district” but stating that the Criminal Division 
“supervision” of the U.S. Attorneys frequently requires the division to “advise and counsel with 
him”).  Similar statements are found in the Attorney General’s annual reports for other years.  See, 
e.g., 1930 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 36. 
154 1944 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 9.  
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1. Power shifts—unevenly—to Washington as the Department enters the 
modern era  
 
By the middle of the Twentieth Century, a good deal of power had shifted to 
Main Justice, though there was substantial variation in the autonomy retained by 
individual districts.155  In addition to improved technology, the relatively small size 
of most U.S. Attorneys’ Offices facilitated departmental control during this 
period,156 as did high turnover rates and the limited experience of AUSAs.  
Because AUSAs were not well compensated and lacked job security, their tenure 
and expertise were generally quite limited.157  The lack of in-house manpower and 
expertise made U.S. Attorneys’ Offices dependent on Main Justice to take over 
complex, time-consuming cases or send attorneys from Washington.158 
The Department also took formal steps to regulate the U.S. Attorneys and to 
eliminate some of their authority.  In 1953, the Department established the 
Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys and promulgated the first version of the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual, which was a comprehensive set of formal instructions.159  In 
1966, the attorney general created the organized crime strike forces, which 
eventually expanded to have offices in scores of cities.160  The strike force 
attorneys reported directly to the Department, not to the local U.S. Attorney, and 
they were seen as a serious blow to the autonomy of the U.S. Attorneys and their 
control of federal law enforcement in their districts.161  The tension between strike 
forces and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices was well known, and the strain was especially 
pronounced in districts with the greatest tradition of autonomy.162 
When James Eisenstein completed the field research for his classic study 
Counsel for the United States in the 1970s, he found the relationship between Main 
Justice and individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to be in flux.163  There were 
                                                                                                                            
155 EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 10–11. 
156 Id. at 5  (noting that in 1968 almost half of USAOs had four or fewer AUSAs, and by 1975 
more than half still had only four to ten AUSAs). 
157 Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 231. 
158 Id. 
159 EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 10. 
160 For a description of the development of the strike forces and their organization, see Note, 
The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 
496, 509–21 (1970). 
161 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 90 (describing the removal of cases from the U.S. 
Attorneys by mechanisms such as the strike forces as the biggest long term threat to the autonomy of 
the U.S. Attorneys and noting that the autonomy of the offices that were least successful in resisting 
the strike forces was “significantly eroded”). 
162 See Ruff, supra note 126, at 1205–06 (noting the exacerbation of the “strain between the 
Department and the field” resulting from actions of strike forces “in some federal districts that 
historically have had the most independent and well-staffed United States Attorneys’ Offices”). 
163 EISENSTEIN, supra note 66, at 231 (“The confluence of the multiple factors shaping 
headquarters and field interactions produced four distinct patterns: ‘normal,’ ‘controlled or ideal,’ 
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significant differences in the degree of autonomy accorded to the various U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices.  Some U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were operating as “ideal field 
offices” with little independence, but a few others were “semi-autonomous.”164  
Having a larger number of experienced AUSAs enabled some U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices to end their reliance on Main Justice for manpower and expertise.165  For 
example, the Southern District of New York, with almost seventy AUSAs, rarely 
ceded cases to attorneys from Main Justice.166 
 
2. Federal law enforcement changes dramatically 
 
By 1970, the federal criminal justice system was undergoing a profound series 
of changes, which inevitably influenced the role of the U.S. Attorneys and their 
relationship to Main Justice.  Criminal law became a hot button political issue in 
the late 1960s, serving as a focal point in presidential and congressional election 
campaigns.167  Federal criminal law expanded in every sense.168  New federal 
criminal statutes proliferated.  In 1998, an American Bar Association Task Force 
on the Federalization of Crime found that more than forty percent of the federal 
criminal laws enacted since the Civil War had been passed in a period of roughly 
twenty-five years, between 1970 and 1998.169  Another study found that there was 
over a one-third increase in federal offenses carrying criminal penalties between 
1980 and 2004.170  It is now impossible to say exactly how many federal offenses 
there are, but the best estimate is that there are more than four thousand.171 
                                                                                                                            
‘conflict,’ and ‘semi-autonomous.’”). 
164 Id. at 232.  
165 Id. at 236.   
166 See id. at 232. 
167 See generally Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, 
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal 
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.  23, 32–44 (1997). 
168 For a discussion of some of the implications of this growth, see generally Sara Sun Beale, 
The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 
AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005). 
169 James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law: Task Force on the Federalization 
of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 7.  
170 JOHN S. BAKER, JR. & DALE E. BENNETT, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL 
CRIME LEGISLATION 8 (Federalist Society ed., 2004), at http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070404_crimreportfinal.pdf.  
171 Id. at 4–9.  There are several difficulties in getting an accurate count.  Because multiple 
crimes are typically stated in the same section of a statute, it can be very difficult to determine how 
many different offenses are actually created by a single statute.  See id. at 7–8.  Another problem is 
finding all of the relevant statutes.  Although many criminal statutes are gathered in Title 18 of the 
U.S. Code, the remainder are scattered throughout the other 50 titles, which encompass more than 
27,000 pages.  Ronald K. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 45, 53 (1998).  Many of these statutory provisions incorporate by reference administrative 
regulations (and may punish as crimes, for example, willful violations).  According to American Bar 
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Federal law now overlaps very substantially with state law, reaching at least 
some instances of many state offenses, including theft, fraud, extortion, bribery, 
assault, domestic violence, robbery, murder, weapons offenses, and drug 
offenses.172  There are also many more defendants in the federal system.  The 
number of criminal cases and defendants in the federal system has increased very 
rapidly.  The federal criminal caseload has roughly doubled in the last twenty-five 
years.173  Given the limited resources in the federal system, even this increased 
number of federal cases represents only a fraction of the defendants whose conduct 
could have been prosecuted under federal law.  The mismatch between the broad 
scope of federal criminal law and the relatively narrow scope of federal resources 
requires federal prosecutors to select a small fraction of cases to prosecute in 
federal court, leaving the remainder to be prosecuted under state law.  As I have 
argued elsewhere, the federal prosecutor’s choice has profound consequences for 
defendants.  Prosecuting a case under federal rather than state law generally 
subjects a defendant to a much harsher sentence for the same conduct,174 and the 
defendant may also be deprived of procedural protections that would be available 
under state law.175 
Key federal offenses have also been given an expansive interpretation, leaving 
their outer boundaries not only broad, but ill-defined.  This is particularly true of 
the main offenses used to prosecute political corruption at the state and local level: 
mail fraud, Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right, and federal program 
bribery.176  Georgia Thompson and Don Siegelman were charged with these 
offenses.177  The broad interpretation of these statutes, first advanced in 
                                                                                                                            
Association, there are almost 10,000 such administrative regulations that may be subject to criminal 
enforcement.  Strazella, supra note 169, at 10. 
172 See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper 
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997–98 (1995). 
173 The United States commenced 32,682 criminal cases in 1982 and 35,872 in 1983.  BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: ONLINE, 
tbl.5.8.2007, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t582007.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 
2008).  In 2007, it commenced 68,413.  Id.  It should be noted, however, that fluctuations in the 
federal caseload are not new.  The peak was more than 92,000 cases during Prohibition, as an 
avalanche of small cases hit the federal courts, and increases in the caseload in the 1990s brought the 
numbers back to the same rate as the early 1970s.  See Beale, supra note 172, at 984 n.19 (describing 
caseload fluctuation); cf. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun 
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J. 
1641, 1646–48 (2002) (suggesting a positive political theory explanation for United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995), as a manifestation of the Supreme Court’s concern that the federal courts would 
be flooded with criminal cases and become low status “police courts”). 
174 Beale, supra note 168, at 761–65. 
175 Id. at 768–69.  It is, however, also possible that in some cases state law may provide greater 
protections than federal law.  
176 For a general discussion of the breadth of these offenses, see NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA 
SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 160–328 (4th ed. 2006). 
177 See supra text accompanying notes 84–122. 
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prosecutions brought by U.S. Attorneys,178 exponentially increased the power of 
federal prosecutors, giving them an entirely new form of discretion to formulate 
standards of good government and to apply them retroactively to state and local 
officials.179 
The last two ingredients in the contemporary federal system are the nearly 
complete shift to an administrative system, rather than an adversarial trial-focused 
system, and the adoption of national sentencing guidelines and laws imposing 
harsher sentences.  Each of these two changes is significant, and they are even 
more powerful in tandem.  More than ninety percent of all federal convictions are 
now obtained by a guilty plea.180  In 2004 there were only 3,346 federal criminal 
trials, though more than 83,000 federal defendants’ cases were concluded.181  In 
contrast to the traditional expectation that the prosecutor will be subject to multiple 
checks in an adversarial process that ends in a public jury trial supervised by an 
independent judge, an administrative system of criminal justice has emerged.182  
Federal prosecutors plea bargain with the advantage of both the broad jurisdiction 
available under federal law and the leverage that flows from the harsh federal  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
178 See Ruff, supra note 126, at 1205–06 (noting that the U.S. Attorney who advanced the 
innovative interpretation of the Hobbs Act did so in violation of two different sections of the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Manual). 
179 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone 
to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 163–70, 187–99 (1994) (describing the development 
of the intangible rights doctrine in lower court decisions and its adoption by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 
1346 and arguing that it renders the mail fraud act unconstitutionally vague); Gregory Howard 
Williams, Good Government By Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 137 (1990).  Noting the perception that there is a Hobson’s choice “between enacting a 
specific statute that may be circumvented or a vague statute that is subject to selective enforcement,” 
Professor Moohr observes that “[s]ince the late 1970s, law enforcement officials, the judiciary, and, 
in their turn, legislators, have chosen the latter option.”  Moohr, supra, at 156. 
For cases considering vagueness challenges, see United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d 
Cir. 2002) (holding honest services provision of mail fraud act unconstitutionally vague as applied), 
overruled by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
180 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. C 
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/FigC.pdf (showing that in FY 2007, 95.8% 
of convictions were obtained by guilty plea and 4.2% were obtained by trial). 
181 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.5.17.2004, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172004.pdf 
(including bench and jury trials for defendants convicted and acquitted). 
182 Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2118 (1998). 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:369 
 
402
sentencing laws.183  In effect, federal prosecutors may exercise both adjudicative 
and lawmaking authority.184 
 
3. More changes in the relationship between Main Justice and the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices 
 
Following nationwide trends, the attorney general and the political leadership 
of the Department focused increasing attention on the regulation of prosecutorial 
behavior in order to promote uniformity and define departmental policies and 
priorities.185  The Attorney General promulgated the Principles of Federal 
Prosecution in 1980.186  The Principles of Federal Prosecution speak in general 
terms, but they are supplemented by the now massive U.S. Attorneys Manual, 
which includes more than 200 provisions that require prior approval, consultation, 
or notification.187  These initiatives have had the effect of reducing the autonomy 
of individual U.S. Attorneys.  For example, concerns regarding the potential for 
disparity in the administration of the federal death penalty led to the adoption of a 
procedure in which the Attorney General makes the determination whether to seek 
the death penalty, and bases this determination on the recommendation of a Capital 
                                                                                                                            
183 Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
1409, 1415 (2003) (noting that “the increased severity of federal sentences, coupled with the wide 
discretion in charges available to the federal prosecutor on a single set of facts” has depressed the 
federal trial rate to an unprecedented level).  Wright and Miller have recommended that plea 
bargaining be limited to avoid abuse.  Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) (advocating aggressive screening of cases and limits on pre-
charge bargaining).  But see Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are 
We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1405 n.9 (2003) (arguing that the presence of a 
“meaningful opportunity” for trial serves as a check on prosecutorial overreaching). 
184 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
505, 509 (2001) (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of 
police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long.”). 
185 The scholarship of Kenneth Culp Davis, an administrative law scholar who argued in favor 
of subjecting prosecutorial discretion to regulation and review, was instrumental in generating 
interest on the part of both scholars and policy makers in the regulation of prosecutorial discretion.  
See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969).  For 
an early discussion of the application of Davis’s theories to the Department of Justice, see Norman 
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1 
(1971). 
186 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980), reprinted in 
substantial part in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 317 (1994).  The current version of the PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL PROSECUTION is included in the USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-27.001 to .760, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm.  For a discussion of 
the promulgation of the PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION and other related policy directives, see 
Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Guiding the Discretion of U.S. Attorneys: Department of Justice 
Policies, 1980–1994, in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 299 (1994).  There were earlier, more specific 
prosecutorial guidelines.  See Abrams, supra note 185, at 22–23, 25–26 (discussing guidelines for 
postal obscenity and criminal libel cases and federal-state prosecutions). 
187 USAM, supra note 26, at § 9-2.400 (Prior Approvals Chart). 
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Review Committee at Main Justice and the recommendation of the Deputy 
Attorney General, to whom the committee reports.188  This process has been 
controversial because the Attorney General may not only decline to seek the death 
penalty despite the support of the U.S. Attorney, but may also override the U.S. 
Attorney in cases where they recommend against seeking the death penalty.189   
Approval is required before charges may be brought under a variety of 
criminal statutes.  For example, U.S. Attorneys must seek the approval of Main 
Justice before filing criminal RICO charges and certain types of money laundering 
charges.190  The Department also limits the U.S. Attorneys’ ability to advance 
novel claims under any criminal statute by requiring the approval of the Solicitor 
General before the filing of any appeal or petition for certiorari.191 
Prior approval is also required before taking a wide variety of procedural 
steps, including moving for or consenting to the closing of a judicial proceeding, 
requesting the disclosure of grand jury materials to state or local law enforcement 
officials, or issuing a subpoena to members of the news media, officers of a foreign 
bank or corporation temporarily in the U.S., or persons or entities in the U.S. for 
records located abroad.192  Approval is required before requesting immunity or 
initiating the prosecution of an immunized person.193  In the area of corporate 
investigations, the Department moved from a 1999 policy that gave a high degree 
of deference to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in determining what aspects of corporate 
cooperation to consider in making charging decisions, to one in which consultation 
with Main Justice was required before prosecutors could seek waivers of a  
 
                                                                                                                            
188 USAM, supra note 26, at § 9-10.050.  See generally Rory K. Little, The Federal Death 
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
347, 440 (1999). 
189 See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney 
General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1697 (2003); Richman, supra note 61, at 1393.  See also William Glaberson, Ashcroft’s Push For 
Execution Voids Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at A1 (noting Ashcroft had ordered the death 
penalty in twenty-one cases against the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney in question, and that 
such cases place the U.S. Attorney and AUSAs who must then prosecute the case in a difficult 
position). 
190 USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-110.010 to .900 (RICO procedures); id. § 9-105.300(4) 
(requiring Criminal Division approval before charging a financial institution with money laundering 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957); id.  §§ 9-105.300(4), 9-105.600 (requiring approval of Assistant 
Attorney General of the Criminal Division before indicting attorney for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 
where the criminally derived property is or purports to be fees paid to the attorney for representation).  
Pre-approval is also required in some civil rights and economic espionage prosecutions.  Daniel C. 
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA 
L. REV. 757, 802 (1999). 
191 USAM, supra note 26, § 9-2.170.  See also 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2008) (giving the Solicitor 
General the authority to determine whether and to what extent appeals will be taken by the 
government in any case). 
192 USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-5.150, 9-11.260, 9-13.400, 9-13.525. 
193 Id. §§ 9-23.130, 9-23.400. 
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:369 
 
404
corporation’s attorney client privilege, to the current policy generally forbidding 
prosecutors from seeking such waivers.194 
The broadest restriction on the discretion of local prosecutors came in the 
wake of the adoption of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The adoption of the 
Sentencing Reform Act and the promulgation of the sentencing guidelines 
provided both a rationale and a mechanism for much greater control from 
Washington of core functions in every U.S. Attorney’s Office.195  Reasoning that 
inconsistent prosecutorial charging practices could undermine the sentencing 
uniformity Congress sought to achieve by the creation of the Guidelines system, 
successive attorneys general issued instructions that federal prosecutors should 
generally prosecute the most serious readily provable offense.196  During the Bush 
Administration, the political leadership at Main Justice welcomed legislation that 
greatly restricted downward departures and imposed reporting requirements.197  
Until the Supreme Court’s decision striking down key elements of the Sentencing 
Reform Act, the U.S. Attorneys (and their AUSAs) were subject in every case to a 
web of restrictions under the legislation, the Guidelines themselves, and the 
Departmental regulations.198  Indeed, the Guidelines provided an extraordinary 
new opportunity for greater central control of federal prosecution. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, also had a significant effect on 
                                                                                                                            
194 The evolution of the Department’s regulations on this issue, from Deputy Attorney General 
Larry Thompson’s 2003 memo to the revision adopted by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty in 
2006, is described in Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client 
Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 297–302 (2008).  As Richman notes, the 
McNulty memo distinguished between category I material, for which the approval of both the U.S. 
Attorney and the head of the Criminal Division was required, and category II material, for which the 
written permission of the Deputy Attorney General was required.  Id. at 301.  On August 28, 2008, 
the Department announced the most recent version of its policy, USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-28.000 
to .1300, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.  
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting 
Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-odag-
757.html (noting that “credit for cooperation will not depend on the corporation’s waiver of attorney 
client-privilege,” that prosecutors are not permitted to request category II materials, and that they 
may not consider whether the corporation has advanced attorneys fees to its officers and employees).  
For a discussion of the controversy over the guidelines, and especially the issue of effectively 
compelling a corporate defendant or suspect to waive its attorney client privilege, see Julie R. 
O’Sullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justice’s Privilege Waiver Policy and the Death of 
Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 (2008); see 
also Richman, supra.  
195 See generally Richman, supra note 61, at 1385–95; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: 
Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1440–43 (2008). 
196 Compare Stith, supra note 195, at 1440–43, 1469–71 (describing memoranda from 
Attorneys General Thornburg and Ashcroft), with Sara Sun Beale, The New Reno Bluesheet: A Little 
More Candor Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion, in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 310 (1994) (describing 
memorandum from Attorney General Reno allowing some discretion in prosecuting most serious 
readily provable offense). 
197 See Richman, supra note 195, at 1388–90; Stith, supra note 195, at 1461–63, 1465–67. 
198 See Stith, supra note 195, at 1468–71. 
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the Department’s priorities and general approach.  Terrorism became the top 
departmental priority, and it had a strong centralizing effect, as Department 
officials tried to “run the operation from the top.”199  The Attorney General 
announced a new strategy of prevention (in contrast to the traditional focus on 
prosecutions after criminal activity has occurred),200 and the Department took steps 
“to maintain a coordinated and consistent national program while at the same time 
empowering U.S. Attorneys’ Office across the country to pursue terrorism 
investigations and prosecutions.”201  The Department mandated that each U.S. 
Attorney create an Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) and appoint a senior 
prosecutor as the ATAC coordinator to undertake a variety of responsibilities.202  
In 2006, a National Security Division was established within Main Justice to 
centralize management and coordinate operations and policy.203  The attorneys 
from the new division have been actively involved in the decision of whether and 
when to prosecute cases handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices.204 
Although the Department has unquestionably expanded its authority and 
correspondingly reduced that of the U.S. Attorneys, some factors have helped the 
U.S. Attorneys retain a degree of their traditional independence and autonomy.  
Although Congress promoted and even required central review of some 
prosecutorial actions under the Guidelines, Daniel Richman has shown that over 
the past several decades Congress has also acquiesced in, and even supported, 
significant decentralization and independence in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.205  In 
some cases, legislators have said so explicitly, and in other cases they have done so 
                                                                                                                            
199 Richman, supra note 195, at 1383–84. 
200 See COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 5 
(June 22, 2006), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (stating that September 
11 “transformed the mission” of the Department and describing the “new strategy of prevention” as 
the department’s “number one goal”). 
201 Id. at 6. 
202 Id. at 5–6. 
203 For a description of the National Security Division’s origins and its first 18 months of 
operation, see NATIONAL SECURITY DIV., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT (April 2008), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/docs/2008/nsd-progress-rpt-2008.pdf. 
204 NSD attorneys provide guidance on the important question of when to bring criminal 
charges.  The decision to prosecute a suspect exposes the Government’s interest in that 
person and effectively terminates covert intelligence investigation.  Such determinations 
require the careful balancing of important competing interests: the immediate 
incapacitation of a terrorist suspect and resultant disruption of terrorist activities through 
prosecution, on the one hand, and the continuation of intelligence collection about the 
subject’s plans, capabilities, and confederates on the other.  The National Security 
Division is well positioned to contribute to that decision-making process, by virtue of its 
role in overseeing both the prosecution and intelligence components of the Justice 
Department’s national security efforts.   
Id. at 12. 
205 Richman, supra note 190, at 805–10.  
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implicitly by directing more resources and personnel to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
while limiting those given to Main Justice.206  These actions seem to reflect 
Congress’s recognition of the value of the U.S. Attorneys as “a critical 
counterweight to Washington politics.”207  For example, the independent role of 
the U.S. Attorneys during the Watergate era compared favorably to Main Justice, 
which succumbed to political pressures.208  Richman also notes that 
decentralization serves another function, permitting Congress to distance itself, 
when necessary, from enforcement decisions made in individual U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices.209 
Other changes have profoundly altered the national staffing patterns of U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, promoting the independence and autonomy of those offices.  
The growth in the federal caseload has required many more prosecutors, and the 
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have grown substantially.  At the end of 2006, there were 
approximately 8,000 lawyers working for the Department of Justice.210  Of those, 
about two thirds were in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices rather than Main Justice.211  
Although U.S. Attorneys’ Offices conduct civil as well as criminal litigation, they 
allocate seventy-nine percent of their salaries to criminal litigation.212  The large 
number of federal prosecutors and federal prosecutions by itself increases the 
difficulty of central oversight.  Equally important, the position of AUSA has been 
                                                                                                                            
206 Id. at 806–07. 
207 Id. at 808. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 809. 
210 The Department of Justice Budget and Performance Summary reports a total of 7,893 
attorneys on board at the end of 2006, including 2,232 performing general legal activities, 345 in the 
Antitrust Division (which is broken out because it is funded differently), and 5,316 in the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2008 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 36 (2008) 
[hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET SUMMARY], 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008summary/pdf/036_employment_categories.pdf.  The Department 
estimated that it would have 8,662 attorneys in 2007.  Id.   
211 Id.  The Statistical Report for the U.S. Attorneys reports a higher percentage of attorneys 
are found in the Justice Department, but this seems to reflect the inclusion of lawyers whose duties do 
not involve litigation.  For fiscal year 2006, this report states that AUSAs constituted fifty-six percent 
of all Department attorneys and seventy percent of the Department attorneys with prosecution or 
litigation responsibilities.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES 
ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 3 
(2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2006/06statrpt.pdf.  
212 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 210, at 82, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008summary/pdf/081_usa.pdf (estimating that 8,079 of personnel in U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices, or approximately seventy-nine percent, are involved in criminal litigation and 
2,142 in civil litigation).  Similarly, the Statistical Report for the U.S. Attorneys states that in fiscal 
year 2006 about seventy-eight percent of attorney personnel were devoted to criminal prosecutions, 
and ninety-five percent of all attorney work hours in the federal courts involved criminal rather than 
civil cases.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 3.   
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transformed from one of patronage to quasi-civil service.213  Only a few decades 
ago, most AUSAs left their posts when the presidential administration changed.214  
But civil service protection, including the right to appeal removal,215 and increased 
salaries216 made the position more attractive and politically insulated.  By 2006, 
AUSAs nationwide had an average of eleven years of experience in the U.S. 
Attorneys’ Office, as well as prior legal experience.217  As the number, tenure, and 
experience level of AUSAs has grown, information networks have developed 
among them.218  The emergence of a cadre of well-connected career AUSAs has 
become a major factor promoting the autonomy of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices.219  
In effect, more offices have reached the size and complexity of the exceptional 
offices that had the greatest autonomy when Eisenstein conducted his study in the 
early 1970s. 
The Department itself has also taken at least one major organizational step to 
return power to the U.S. Attorneys, merging the organized crime strike forces into 
the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.  The strike forces, which operated from 1966 to 1990, 
used integrated teams of prosecutors and agents to bring down numerous members 
and associates of Cosa Nostra, but they also provoked strenuous opposition from 
the U.S. Attorneys.220  Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who dissolved the 
                                                                                                                            
213 Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 235–39, n.44. 
214 See Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
(1978) (statement of Griffin Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (discussing the high rate of 
turnover of AUSAs in the late 1960s through the 1970s).  See also EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 33 
(noting that in many districts the appointment of AUSAs involved the U.S. Attorney in politics, 
requiring a “complex process of negotiation, bargaining, and clearance of appointees with party 
leaders”). 
215 See Hamlett v. Dep’t of Justice, 90 M.S.P.R. 674 (2002) (holding that the removal power 
specified by 28 U.S.C. § 542 does not bar an appeal under subch. II of ch. 75 of title 5), noted in 
Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 237 n.44. 
216 See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States 
Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 283 (2002) 
(“General job satisfaction aside, two themes consistently were repeated in my interviews to explain 
the growing length of tenure among assistants: first, the creation of a quasi-civil-service status for 
assistants, and second, a significant increase in salary vis-à-vis the private sector, coupled with a 
comparatively less demanding work environment.”). 
217 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 3.   
218 Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 239. 
219 See id. at 239–40 (“The presence of career attorneys who take pride in their skills, regard 
themselves as at least as knowledgeable and experienced as attorneys at Main Justice, and adhere to 
their offices’ traditions of independence, all promote autonomy from DOJ control.”)  Note, however, 
that some experts contend that the increasing longevity and importance of AUSAs has negatively 
impacted U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.  See Lochner, supra note 216, at 284–87 (describing the problem 
of “deadwood” AUSAs—careerists lacking motivation to take on complicated, time-intensive 
matters—as making it more difficult for U.S. Attorneys to set prosecutorial agendas). 
220 See Note, The Strike Force, supra note 160, at 519, tbl.II (strike force indictments and 
convictions for about nineteen months, half of which involved members or associates of Cosa 
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strike forces, had opposed the independence of strike force attorneys when he 
served as the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia.221  While the strike forces were still 
operating, they had earned the ire of not only the local U.S. Attorneys, but also 
local judges who preferred the practices of their local U.S. Attorneys.  Indeed, the 
Second Circuit once used its “supervisory power” to reverse a conviction because 
the strike force attorney had deviated from the practice of the local U.S. 
Attorney.222  The court justified its ruling as a “one-time sanction to encourage 
uniformity of practice,” noting that it had surveyed the U.S. Attorneys in the circuit 
and determined that all of them followed the same practice of giving grand jury 
witnesses certain warnings.223  The case was remarkable both for its highly 
questionable use of “supervisory power”224 and the court’s open hostility to the 
division of authority between the strike forces and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.225 
Finally, the growth in the federal caseload has effectively increased the 
discretion of both U.S. Attorneys and their AUSAs.  At each critical stage—
charging, plea negotiations, and sentencing—the sheer size of the federal caseload 
                                                                                                                            
Nostra).  See also ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 176, at 8–9.  
221 See James B. Jacobs & Elizabeth A. Mullin, Congress’ Role in the Defeat of Organized 
Crime, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 269, 291 & n.140 (2003) (noting that critics charged Thornburg’s proposal 
to eliminate the strike forces was motivated by turf concerns and citing Sen. Edward Kennedy’s 
congressional testimony that as a former U.S. Attorney, Thornburg had “a longstanding record of 
siding with the U.S. attorneys against strike forces in this turf battle”). 
222 United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976). 
223 Id. at 773–74.  The court stated: 
Surprised, as we were, to find that what we had thought to be a common practice of 
prosecutors in the circuit for more than twenty years was not followed, we canvassed 
each of the United States Attorneys in the circuit for their practice in this regard.  We 
were informed that every United States Attorney, in practice, warns the potential 
defendant that he is a target of the investigation.  The appeal before us involved a 
prosecution by the Strike Force in the Eastern District of New York as authorized by 28 
U.S.C. § 515. 
Id. at 774.  The court then parsed the department’s regulations, concluding that the strike forces 
should be subject to the direction of the U.S. Attorneys and also made clear its discomfort with the 
strike force, stating that the court was “not committed by statute to allowing them to come into the 
circuit and to evade the rules and supervision of the United States Attorneys.”  Id. at 774. 
224 The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ original decision in light of its holding 
that target warnings were not required.  Upon remand, the court of appeals made clear that its 
decision rested on its supervisory power, and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari and twice 
heard argument in the case before dismissing it as improvidently granted.  See United States v. 
Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), judgment vacated, 429 U.S. 909 (1976), on remand, 547 F.2d 
772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), and cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978).  For 
a discussion of supervisory power including the Jacobs case, see Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering 
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the 
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984). 
225 The author of the opinion, Judge Murray Gurfein, had served briefly as an AUSA in the 
Southern District of New York.  See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts, 
Gurfein, Murray Irwin, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=930.  No other member of the panel 
had experience as a federal prosecutor. 
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makes centralized control very difficult.  The difficulty of exercising supervision 
from Main Justice is perhaps greatest in the case of the day to day decisions about 
which cases to prosecute, since a case that is never filed is ordinarily invisible to 
both members of the public and officials in Washington.  
Thus, at the end of the day, U.S. Attorneys still wield substantial authority, 
and that is especially true of the largest offices with the strongest traditions of 
autonomy. 
 
D. The Appointment and Removal of U.S. Attorneys 
 
As noted above,226 the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the presidential 
appointment of the federal attorneys and marshals in each district with the advice 
and consent of the Senate.  There appears to be general agreement that from the 
outset the position of federal district attorney (later U.S. Attorney) was regarded as 
a “‘political plum[]’” that went to party stalwarts,227 as well as agreement that 
senators played an important role in the selection of candidates.  Indeed, precisely 
these features of the system have generated periodic calls for reform dating from at 
least as early as the 1920s.228 
Writing in 1937, former Attorney General Homer Cummings stated, “the rule 
of senatorial courtesy gives individual Senators great powers in the selection of 
district attorneys and marshals, an effective veto which imports local politics into 
the administration of federal justice.”229  A few years earlier, the National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement headed by former Attorney 
General Wickersham made the same point, in greater detail, and argued that the 
political character of the selection process was a serious problem: 
 
At times, however, an obstacle to effective control and efficient 
prosecution has been found in the power of the Senate with respect to 
appointments.  The claim of the Senate not merely to exercise a 
                                                                                                                            
226 See supra Part II.A. 
227 HUSTON, supra note 130, at 64.  These were, of course, members of the president’s party.  
Eisenstein notes that “[i]n the overwhelming proportion of appointments, the department only 
considers lawyers belonging to the president’s political party.”  EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 35.  
228 PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCES, supra note 136, at 44 (describing proposals in 1924 
following Teapot Dome scandal and in 1953 “after scandals in the Justice Department during the 
Truman administration” to appoint U.S. Attorneys on the basis of merit, rather than politics, or to 
place them under civil service and allow them to move freely from one district to another).  Note that 
in 1924 “[a] representative of the Attorney General’s office” recommended that both the U.S. 
Attorneys and the Attorney General be appointed on the basis of merit rather than politics.  Id.  
229 CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 499.  Luther Huston agreed, commenting 
that “no district attorney or marshal is likely to be appointed or removed without the approval of his 
Senator or congressman.”  James Eisenstein also recognized that senatorial courtesy gives senators a 
“potent resource” that they can use “to exert significant influence on the final appointment,” but he 
emphasized that several other factors affect the strategic environment for the appointments process.  
EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 35. 
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collective power of rejecting unfit nominations but to dictate 
appointments as the patronage of the Senators of the State in which the 
district lies has often had a bad effect upon the personnel and conduct of 
the office.  Also in States where the Senators are in opposition to the 
administration it happens too often that local political organizations insist 
on treating the office as political patronage . . . .  The great powers of the 
district attorney under the continual extensions of Federal jurisdiction in 
the present century are giving increasing political importance to the 
office.  Hence this treatment of it as a reward for political activity is a 
serious menace to enforcement of law.230 
 
Another study of the Department of Justice concluded that the external 
political constraints on the president’s appointment power were at their zenith in 
the case of U.S. Attorneys, because “these are local offices aspired to by men 
whose support is valued by Senators from their state and Congressmen from their 
district,” and “often these aspirants are political leaders themselves in their 
area.”231 
The only area of disagreement seems to be over the precise balance of power 
between the senators and the president and his attorney general.  Some observers 
of the Department concluded that the appointment process has been turned on its 
head, with the senators effectively initiating nominations which are then submitted 
to the President for approval.  Daniel Meador and former Attorney General Griffin 
Bell wrote: 
 
The system has been and continues to be one in which the Senators, in 
effect, often nominate individuals, the President consents, and then the 
Senate confirms.  If there are no Senators of the President’s party from 
the state involved, then the state’s representatives of the President’s party 
or other local party officials usually make the initial choice.232 
 
James Eisenstein found that it was common for Senators to propose 
candidates to the president, though in most cases they submitted a list containing 
multiple names.233  He also emphasized that a number of factors influence the 
appointments process.  For example, when a new administration takes office, the 
                                                                                                                            
230 GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM, NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, 
REPORT ON PROSECUTION 9 (1931). 
231 HUSTON, supra note 142, at 50.  Huston states that it is sometimes more difficult to satisfy 
local politicians regarding the appointment of U.S. Attorneys and marshals than the appointment of 
Supreme Court justices).  Id.  Huston served as the Director of Public Information for the Department 
of Justice under Attorney General Rogers from 1957–61.  See Rolland L. Soule, Political Science 
Book Reviews, 59 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 639 (1968). 
232 Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 249. 
233 EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 43. 
2009] RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS  
 
411 
president must satisfy numerous patronage commitments and political obligations 
incurred in the process of the nomination and election, and the new 
administration’s policy objectives will also play a role.234  Districts also varied a 
great deal in their views of the U.S. Attorney’s role, with some districts having a 
much greater expectation that the appointees will have significant legal stature and 
experience, and others placing a much greater emphasis on the candidate’s political 
qualifications.235  Senators also varied substantially in their interest in pushing 
particular candidates.236 
The active role taken by many senators and the ability of home state senators 
to veto a nomination means that many U.S. Attorneys owe their appointments 
primarily to persons other than the attorney general or the president.  This may 
lead to “a divided or ambiguous sense of allegiance” on the part of the U.S. 
Attorneys.237  As noted in part I, for example, David Iglesias felt such a sense of 
allegiance to Senator Domenici.238 
In theory, the president’s power to remove U.S. Attorneys has always been 
available “both as a stick used against disobedient U.S. Attorneys and a carrot to 
others still in office.”239  But presidents have rarely used removal to restrict the 
independence of U.S. Attorneys, at least in recent decades.240  Of fifty-four U.S. 
Attorneys who did not serve a full term between 1981 and 2006, two were 
removed by the president, three resigned after news reports indicated they had 
engaged in questionable personal actions, and for another three, no information 
was available.241  In 1974, former Attorney General Richard D. Kleindienst 
testified to Congress that “[i]n 4 ½ years, I think there were only one or two 
situations where a U.S. Attorney fell below the high standards that we felt should 
be maintained and were asked to resign.”242  According to Kleindienst, these U.S. 
Attorneys “resigned without any hesitation or question whatsoever.”243  In other 
circumstances, a U.S. Attorney’s political support may actually prevent removal.244  
                                                                                                                            
234 Id. at 37. 
235 Id. at 38–39. 
236 Id. at 42. 
237 Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 248–49. 
238 See text accompanying notes 33–34. 
239 Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of 
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 206 (2008). 
240 KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN 
FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS 1981–2006 (2007), discussed by Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra 
note 66, at 233–34. 
241 SCOTT, supra note 240, at 6–7.  This number does not include U.S. Attorneys “whose 
tenure was interrupted by a change in presidential administration.”  Id. at Summary. 
242 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on S. 2803 and S. 2978 
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 76 
(1974) (statement of Richard G. Kleindienst) [hereinafter Hearing on Removing Politics]. 
243 Id. 
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Still, removal has been identified as a controversial but potentially effective 
mechanism of presidential control.245 
 
E. Statutory Reforms Affecting the Department 
 
The Watergate scandal provided the impetus for the enactment of legislation 
that addressed concerns about the possible misuse of prosecutorial authority by 
creating the offices of special prosecutor and inspector general.  The enactment of 
these reforms likely took some of the steam off other more radical proposals, 
discussed in Part III,246 to restructure the Department.   
The first innovation, the creation of an inspector general within the 
Department of Justice, set the stage for the investigation and report described in 
Part I.  The legislation creating the post was not enacted until 1988,247 following a 
decade of opposition from the Department.248  The Department argued that the 
creation of an inspector general would interfere with the Attorney General’s law 
enforcement responsibilities.249  Congress responded to these concerns by enacting 
provisions specific to the inspector general of the Department of Justice.250  For 
                                                                                                                            
244 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 98 (describing the comments of a former attorney 
general who fired some U.S. Attorneys but chose not to fire others to avoid conflict with interested 
senators). 
245 H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 129, 147 (1998) (“Firing a U.S. Attorney is a dramatic action that could have all sorts of 
political ramifications.  Nevertheless, Presidents could undoubtedly control U.S. Attorneys better if 
they were willing to fire a few, particularly if done at the recommendation of the Attorney General.”). 
246 See infra text accompanying notes 251 to 252. 
247 Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(c), 102 Stat. 
2515, 2515 (1988). 
248 See STAFF OF LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMM. OF H. COMM. ON 
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 100TH CONG., THE NEED FOR A STATUTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL IN THE 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (Comm. Print 1988), for a description of struggles by the House of 
Representatives to create an inspector general in the Department of Justice.  According to that report, 
“Justice was not included in the Inspector General Act of 1978 so that its need for a statutory IG 
could be thoroughly reviewed.”  Id. at 4.  The House tried to create an inspector general at the 
Department of Justice in each of the 96th through 99th Congresses, but the Senate killed the attempts.  
Id. at 1.  The department contended that it already had auditing mechanisms in place, id. at 1, and 
raised “concern over the impact of an IG on departmental law enforcement operations and the ability 
of the Attorney General to exercise broad-based discretion in directing Justice’s investigative, 
prosecutorial, and litigation functions.”  Id. at 4. 
249 The Department opposed the legislation on the following grounds:  
First, it would impose an Inspector General on the law enforcement authority of the 
Attorney General; second, it would allow the Inspector General to interfere with or 
jeopardize ongoing external investigations and prosecutions; and, third, it may require or 
permit the Inspector General to disclose sensitive or confidential information.  
Inspector General Act Amendments of 1987: Hearing on S. 908 Before the S. Comm. on Government 
Affairs, 100th Cong. 29 (1987) (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United 
States). 
250 See VANESSA K. BURROWS & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY 
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example, the Attorney General has greater power to end an investigation by the 
inspector general than the heads of other departments,251 and the Office of 
Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice has greater authority over 
the actions of attorneys in the department.252 
A decade earlier, in a direct response to the Watergate scandal, Congress 
created the office of special prosecutor (subsequently renamed independent 
counsel) as part of the Ethics in Government Act.253  This innovative approach was 
relatively short lived.  The special prosecutor/independent counsel was to be 
independent from the Department of Justice and Attorney General, so that it could 
pursue investigations and prosecutions against senior officials within the 
Department or other parts of the Administration free from political interference or 
conflicts of interest.  Although the Supreme Court upheld the legislation,254 it was 
allowed to lapse in 1999.255  Subsequent “independent counsel” have been 
appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to Departmental regulations, rather 
than legislation.256   
 
III. RETHINKING THE STATUS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY 
 
The preceding review of the problems experienced during the Bush 
Administration and the historical evolution of the U.S. Attorneys’ position 
spotlights several key issues.  First, there is a danger that the U.S. Attorney’s 
prosecutorial decision making can be improperly influenced by partisan politics.  
Partisan influence or pressure can come from a wide range of sources, including 
                                                                                                                            
INSPECTORS GENERAL: LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 2 n.3  (2007), for a list of 
agencies in which the head has increased control over the inspector general. 
251 5 U.S.C. § 8E(a)(1) (2006) (allowing the Attorney General to intervene in the inspector 
general’s investigation if it involves certain areas of “sensitive information”). 
252 See 5 U.S.C. § 8E(b)(3) (2006) (requiring the inspector general of the Department of 
Justice to “refer to the Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice, 
allegations of misconduct involving Department attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement 
personnel, where the allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, 
litigate, or provide legal advice, except that no such referral shall be made if the attorney is employed 
in the Office of Professional Responsibility”). 
253 The office of independent counsel was created by Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 40 
(1978), and reauthorized for five years by the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§591–599).  Although it 
lapsed December 15, 1992, by failure of reauthorization, it was reinstituted by the Independent 
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 591–599). 
254 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
255 It expired at midnight on June 30, 1999.  For a critique of the independent counsel statute 
and an argument in favor of allowing it to expire, see Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel 
Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996). 
256 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2009) (establishing grounds for appointment of an independent 
counsel). 
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members of Congress, home-state politicians and party activists, and the White 
House itself.  It may also arise from the U.S. Attorney’s own political ambitions.  
But improper partisan efforts to manipulate prosecutorial charging decisions must 
be distinguished from proper efforts to prosecute politically sensitive cases or to 
compel adherence to the administration’s priorities257 and also from the exercise of 
the president’s prerogative to appoint or remove individuals who have his full 
confidence.  Federal prosecutors must make choices about the allocation of 
resources, selecting the kinds of cases and the individual defendants who will face 
federal charges.  Indeed, the need to prioritize has become even more critical 
because of the explosive growth in the number and reach of federal criminal laws 
and in the number of federal prosecutions.  Federal criminal jurisdiction now 
covers much of the same ground as state criminal law.  Federal prosecutors can 
reach a breathtakingly wide range of conduct, and they have enormous leverage in 
a largely administrative system with extremely high sentences.  The danger of 
partisan manipulation has increased as well, because of the breadth and vagueness 
of key federal corruption offenses.  The growth of federal criminal law makes it 
necessary to reassess the competing values of centralization to achieve uniformity 
and best practices versus decentralization and flexibility to adapt to the enormous 
variation in conditions from district to district.  Those competing values are 
reflected in the division of authority between the U.S. Attorneys and the senior 
leadership in Main Justice.  
In the aftermath of the Watergate crisis, there were serious proposals for a 
radical redesign of the Department of Justice to lessen the president’s control and 
make it operate more like an independent agency258 or to carve out the 
prosecutorial function and place it in a separate nonpolitical agency.259  Whatever 
                                                                                                                            
257 As Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias have demonstrated, this is a very difficult line to draw.  
See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 9. 
258 In 1974, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary held hearings on several plans to reform the Department of Justice.  Hearing on Removing 
Politics, supra note 242.  Senator Sam Ervin testified that he was “convinced of the utter necessity of 
removing the Department, insofar as it is possible, from the play of partisan politics.”  Id. at 3 
(statement of Sen. Sam Ervin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary).  He proposed a bill removing the Department of Justice from the executive branch.  
This bill would ensure the separation of constitutional powers by establishing the Department of 
Justice as an independent establishment of the United States.  Id.  Under his proposal, the Department 
of Justice would resemble an independent regulatory commission, with the Attorney General 
appointed by the President to a six year term.  Id.  The bill granted the Attorney General power to 
appoint and remove U.S. Attorneys.  
259 Whitney North Seymour, Jr., former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, 
proposed dividing the Department of Justice by function.  See Hearing on Removing, supra note 242, 
at 215–16 (statement of Whitney North Seymour, Jr.).  According to Seymour, the Department was 
flawed because the Attorney General was expected “to serve two masters at the same time”—the 
president and the law.  Id. at 216.  As a remedy, Seymour proposed creating the Office of Chief 
Prosecutor (including the U.S. Attorneys), which would direct “all of the existing civil and criminal 
litigation and law enforcement functions in the Department of Justice.”  Id. at 217–18.  Interestingly, 
though, the appointment power would remain with the president, in order to give U.S. Attorneys “a 
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the merits of such proposals, there is no substantial support at the present time for a 
total redesign of the Department of Justice, particularly one that raises serious 
constitutional issues by seeking to reduce the president’s control over a central 
executive function.260  Accordingly, I take as a starting point the current structure 
of the Department: it is an agency of the executive branch headed by the attorney 
general and other senior officials who are appointed by the president with the 
advice and consent of the Senate and who serve at the president’s pleasure. 
Given the Department’s character as an executive branch agency, the question 
is whether to maintain the unique two-tier structure that now divides authority over 
criminal prosecutions between the presidential appointees serving in Main Justice 
and the 93 presidential appointees serving as the U.S. Attorneys in each federal 
judicial district.  As noted in the preceding section, for more than a century power 
has been shifting, albeit in a halting and uneven fashion, from the U.S. Attorneys 
to the Department.  Should the process of centralization under the attorney general 
and the political leadership in Main Justice be completed?  Perhaps it is time to 
treat the historical status of the U.S. Attorneys as a vestige of the past and to 
convert the position of U.S. Attorney to a career civil service status.261  This would 
bring the department’s structure in line with those of other executive branch 
agencies and reduce the bottleneck in the appointments process that occurs at the 
beginning of each new administration.   
I conclude that the present two-tier structure of the Justice Department should 
be maintained.  Converting the U.S. Attorneys to nonpolitical career employees 
might reduce, but cannot eliminate, the possibility that partisan concerns will 
improperly influence decisions.  The benefits of that reduction in political 
influence must be balanced against the other values served by the present system, 
which provides an important check or counterweight on the authorities in Main 
Justice.  The political character of the current appointment cuts both ways.  It may 
                                                                                                                            
stature in keeping with the importance of the office.”  Id.  Seymour was particularly concerned with 
Senate confirmation, which he saw as the principal source of partisanship among U.S. Attorneys.  Id.  
He, therefore, suggested organizing Circuit Nominating Commissions by federal judicial district.  Id.  
The president would nominate U.S. Attorneys from lists drafted by these commissions, and only then 
would the Senate have its say in the traditional confirmation role.  Id. 
260 For a discussion of some of the constitutional issues, see ROBERT L. TIENKEN, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY S. 2803, 93D CONGRESS—TO ESTABLISH AN 
INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1974), and David C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper?  
Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, and Pretextual 
Justifications in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 353–54 (2008). 
261 Similar—and perhaps even stronger—arguments could be made regarding the traditional 
presidential appointment of the U.S. marshal in each district.  One federal judge has called publicly 
on Congress to professionalize the Marshals Service by eliminating patronage appointments.  Sean P. 
Murphy, Judge Hits Politics in Choice of Marshals, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2007, at B1 (describing 
critical comments of Judge William Young and dismissal of prior marshal in the District of 
Massachusetts after press disclosures of his “lax work habits and use of his government-owned 
vehicle for personal errands”).  Senator Edward Kennedy has supported professionalization of the 
marshals, and he was responsible for adding a provision to the Patriot Act establishing criteria for 
marshals, including four years of command-level law enforcement experience.  Id. 
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be a source of improper pressure on U.S. Attorneys, but as a counterweight it may, 
upon occasion, actually prevent the misuse of prosecutorial authority for partisan 
purposes.  Moreover, to serve as that counterweight, maintaining Senate 
confirmation is highly desirable.  Equally important, by placing greater authority in 
the hands of each U.S. Attorney the current system localizes the administration of 
federal criminal law, reinforcing federalism and allowing districts some leeway to 
adapt federal law to local law enforcement conditions and local practices and 
norms.  It provides a useful structure for a continuing dialogue on what should be 
uniform and what should be tailored to local conditions.  The current system, 
including both presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, also enhances the 
prestige of the U.S. Attorney, attracting candidates and providing them with the 
clout to serve effectively as the chief federal law enforcement officer.  It also 
enhances critical relationships with state and local officials and with federal 
investigative agencies.  The link between the U.S. Attorney and the president who 
appointed her can be a mechanism for enforcing each administration’s policies and 
priorities, and the political skills and contacts of U.S. Attorneys are valuable.  The 
current system also provides a mechanism for political accountability. 
Thus the present system is susceptible to political manipulation, but it would 
be short sighted to dismiss it as a mere historical vestige.  Delegating some degree 
of political authority to the U.S. Attorney in each federal judicial district serves 
many valuable functions.  What is needed, then, are other mechanisms that reduce 
the danger of improper political manipulation.  In the last section of this article, I 
sketch out briefly three approaches that are consistent with the system of 
presidential appointments: screening or nominations panels, restrictions on contact 
between U.S. Attorneys and political officials, and clarifying and perhaps 
restricting the scope of the offenses used to prosecute state and local corruption. 
 
A. Politics and Prosecutions 
 
At first blush the conversion of the position of U.S. Attorney seems desirable 
as a way to take the politics out of federal prosecutions, removing a perennial 
source of concern that became especially pronounced during the Bush 
Administration. 
Because political affiliation and activities are important criteria in the current 
system, U.S. Attorneys often have their own political aspirations and strong 
ideological commitments.262  The risk that politics may improperly influence 
prosecutorial discretion seems to be heightened in a system in which U.S. 
Attorneys are both politically ambitious and ideological.  As H.W. Perry 
explained: 
A person who is seeking high profile cases and is particularly ideological 
                                                                                                                            
262 See Perry, supra note 245, at 143 (creating four-quadrant matrix employing two axes, from 
high to low political aspirations and from highly ideological to non-ideological, which creates four 
types of U.S. Attorneys). 
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might be more tempted to use the power of the office for partisan 
reasons.  High profile cases do not necessarily equal partisan cases, but 
where the U.S. Attorney has high political aspirations and is particularly 
ideological, there seems to be a greater chance for more partisan 
justice.263 
 
As one member of the House Judiciary Committee explained, the present 
selection process produces U.S. Attorneys who “want to be Federal judges, 
Governors, or Congressmen” and “are going to do that which is politically 
expedient for them.”264  Ambitious and ideologically committed U.S. Attorneys 
may want to exercise their authority in a manner that curries favor with the 
president and his political advisers.  And, as noted in Parts I and II, the Senate 
confirmation process gives the home state senators enormous influence at the time 
of the U.S. Attorney’s appointment, which may pave the way for later efforts to 
influence the U.S. Attorney’s prosecutorial decisions.  Any or all of these 
influences might lead the U.S. Attorney to exercise prosecutorial discretion for 
improper partisan reasons, such as accelerating or delaying charges in order to 
influence an election,265 or bringing charges against political opponents based on 
overly broad interpretations of vague statutes such as honest services mail fraud 
and federal program bribery.266  Similar influences may lead the U.S. Attorney to 
ignore corruption, especially if the same party controls the White House and the 
local political machine.267 
In contrast, redefining the U.S. Attorney as a senior nonpartisan position and 
using a civil service merit selection process would generally result in the selection 
of non-ideological U.S. Attorneys with low political aspirations.  This should 
greatly reduce the danger that U.S. Attorneys will act for political reasons.  
Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys would not in any sense be beholden to either the 
president or their home state senators, and hence not subject to pressure from them.  
                                                                                                                            
263 Id. at 144. 
264 Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil 
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 79 (1978) 
(statement of Rep. Robert F. Drinan, Member, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the 
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary).  See also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron 
Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486 (1996) (commenting that because 
U.S. Attorneys are “extraordinarily ambitious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving 
office . . . they have strong incentives to use their power while in office to cater to—or to 
circumvent—local political establishments”). 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 16–24 (describing pressure felt by U.S. Attorney 
Iglesias to bring voter fraud indictments before election). 
266 See supra text accompanying notes 104–05, 106–13 (describing extremely broad 
interpretations of honest services mail fraud federal program bribery in the prosecutions of Georgia 
Thompson and former governor Don Seigelman).  Dan Kahan argues that U.S. Attorneys have an 
incentive to internalize the political benefits and externalize the practical and human costs of 
overbroad interpretations of federal criminal statutes.  Kahan, supra note 264, at 487–88. 
267 I thank Al Alschuler for drawing this point to my attention. 
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For example, if New Mexico U.S. Attorney David Iglesias had been a career civil 
service employee, he would not have felt that he owed his job to Senator Domenici 
or President Bush.  Redefining the U.S. Attorneys as nonpartisan civil service 
employees would also clarify their place within the hierarchy of the Department: 
they would have no claim to independence and would be subject to the supervision 
and control of the political leadership within the Department.  The number of 
nominations from the Justice Department would fall into line with those from other 
departments, reducing the strain on the resources of the Judiciary Committee.  
Redefining the character of the U.S. Attorneys might also increase their quality.  A 
merit selection process should also ensure that every U.S. Attorney would have 
had substantial litigation experience, which is not always the case under the current 
system,268 and it might also produce better management of the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Offices.269  
This thumbnail sketch of nonpartisan U.S. Attorneys has undoubted appeal, 
but recall that our starting point is the assumption that the Department will be 
headed by political appointees, including the Attorney General.  Precisely because 
the Constitution does not permit the prosecutorial function to be divorced entirely 
from politics in its broadest sense, the question is whether—on balance—it is 
helpful to have actors with independent political status and responsibility within 
each judicial district as well as in Washington.  There have been occasional 
suggestions that political interference is more likely or more dangerous at the 
district level,270 but that does not entirely square with the picture that emerges from 
parts I and II of this article.  Indeed, in most of the cases where there have been 
accusations of improper political meddling during the Bush administration, 
officials in the White House were implicated.271  Similarly, during the Nixon 
                                                                                                                            
268 For example, J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., the son of Senator J. Strom Thurmond, was twenty-
nine years old when he was nominated to be U.S. Attorney for South Carolina; he had been a lawyer 
for about three years and had tried seven state cases.  See Clif LeBlanc, 2 Emerge in S.C. Search for 
New U.S. Attorney, THE STATE, Dec. 10, 2004, at B1.  Margaret Currin had been out of law school for 
approximately nine years when she was appointed to succeed her husband, Sam Currin, as U.S. 
Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, but she had little or no trial experience, having 
served first as legislative director and counsel to Senator John Tower, and then as assistant dean and 
associate professor at Campbell University School of Law.  See AMERICAN ASSOC. OF LAW SCHOOLS, 
THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 413 (2007–2008) (biographical entry for Margaret Person 
Currin). 
269 H.W. Perry suggests that U.S. Attorneys who fit this profile (Type IV in his scheme) 
“would run an office that would reward high efficiency” and “would gain satisfaction from 
processing workloads and would seek to maximize winning all types of cases.”  Perry, supra note 
245, at 144. 
270 Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach said that “political influence in the 
administration of justice is more likely to start at the bottom, locally, personally, than at the top.”  
Hearing on Removing Politics, supra note 258, at 155 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach).  
271 See supra text accompanying notes 18–24, 91–96, 114–17 (describing allegations 
concerning involvement of presidential counselor Karl Rove in Thompson and Siegelman 
prosecutions as well as allegations that Senator Domenici and others contacted the White House 
seeking the ouster of U.S. Attorney Iglesias when he refused to prosecute Democrats for election 
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administration, the Attorney General and one Assistant Attorney General were 
convicted of criminal conduct,272 and the Nixon administration has also been 
accused of bringing a politically motivated prosecution against one high profile 
political enemy, former Illinois governor Otto Kerner.273  In contrast, some 
commentators have concluded that the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices should be given 
high marks for their independent and professional performance during the Nixon 
administration.274  Because their constituencies and political loyalties are primarily 
within their own state and judicial district, U.S. Attorneys can function to some 
degree as a check on, or a counterweight against, the political appointees in the 
Department and in the White House. 
Making U.S. Attorneys career appointees or eliminating the requirement of 
Senate confirmation would insulate them from partisan pressures from Congress 
(especially their home-state senators), but it would also affect their ability to 
withstand partisan political pressures from officials in the White House or Main 
Justice.  For example, what if a White House political strategist (who might be in 
league with local officials of their party) wished to use criminal charges to 
neutralize a popular Democratic politician or to create an issue in an upcoming 
election?  A career U.S. Attorney would not share this political goal, but would she 
be in a position to withstand pressure to, for example, continue or expand an 
investigation that does not seem to be leading anywhere?  A career appointee (or a 
political appointee not subject to Senate confirmation) will lack certain advantages 
that flow from the current selection process.  Because the appointment is regarded 
as a political plum, it is ordinarily reserved for a local attorney who knows and is 
                                                                                                                            
fraud). 
272 See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51–52 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding conviction 
of Attorney General John Mitchell).  For a list of those who were indicted by the Watergate grand 
jury, see John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 n.6 (2000).  See 
also id. at 612 (noting others, including former Attorney General Kleindienst, who pled guilty). 
273 One prominent example is the conviction of Otto Kerner (who served as governor of 
Illinois and as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) for depriving his 
constituents of his “honest services” and hence violating the mail fraud statute.  See United States v. 
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (upholding Kerner’s conviction).  
One commentator charged that Kerner was prosecuted because he had earned the ire of Richard 
Nixon for his role in helping to deliver Illinois’s electoral votes to John Kennedy, and that he was the 
“innocent victim of a vindictive president.”  HANK MESSICK, THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTION: JIM 
THOMPSON, MARJE EVERETT, RICHARD NIXON, AND THE TRIAL OF OTTO KERNER 220 (1978).  See also 
Williams, supra note 179, at 148 (noting that Kerner was prosecuted during the Nixon administration, 
which brought no charges against thirteen key legislators who were known to have been involved in 
the conduct that gave rise to Kerner’s prosecution). 
274 See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 255, at 476 nn.55 & 57 (noting that the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office had already developed main outlines of Watergate charges when the Independent Counsel was 
appointed, and also noting the success of U.S. Attorneys in bringing nonpolitical prosecutions of 
other major figures, including Vice President Spiro Agnew); Herbert J. Miller, Jr. & John P. Elwood, 
The Independent Counsel Statute: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
111, 115 (1999) (same). 
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known by her district.275  Many such appointees have already served in elective 
office and have their own political base.276  The confirmation process ensures that 
they have either the active sponsorship or at least the acquiescence of their home-
state senators and other key local political leaders, as well as the local district 
judges.  These local constituencies have historically backed up the U.S. Attorney 
in disputes with the Department.277  A career U.S. Attorney would ordinarily not 
have developed an independent political base, and may indeed have been brought 
in from outside the district.  Indeed, determined political leadership can 
marginalize and even drive out career attorneys who are not seen as compliant or 
committed to the administration’s policies.  It is instructive to compare the 
situation of the U.S. Attorneys, whose noisy removal generated widespread 
criticism in the press, Congressional hearings, and a massive report by the IG, with 
the situation of a number of career supervisory attorneys in the Civil Rights 
Division, whose advice was ignored or overruled by political appointees, and who 
were demoted and reassigned to work on unrelated cases during the Bush 
administration.278 
                                                                                                                            
275 See supra text accompanying notes 221–25. 
276 See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 80–81. 
277 See Eisenstein, supra note 133, at 81 (district judge orders lawyers from Main Justice out of 
the courtroom), id. at 82 (U.S. Attorney refuses to follow instructions from Main Justice and invites 
them to call chief judge of the district knowing that judge would back him up), id. at 115–16 (assaults 
on autonomy of U.S. Attorney would be resisted by alumni of office, including district judges, and 
district court judges would “cut [the] balls off” of a strike force attorney who was not vouched for by 
the local U.S. Attorney). 
278 Some of the issues were aired at a Senate Committee hearing in 2006.  See Oversight of the 
Civil Rights Division: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), 2006 WL 
3324886 (statement of Joseph Rich, Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law) (describing 
how longtime career supervisors in the Civil Rights Division who were considered to have views that 
differed from those of the political appointees in the Bush administration were reassigned or stripped 
of major responsibilities, resulting in loss of morale and a large number attorney resignations), 
available at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=2434&wit_id=5849; Id.  
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).  See also Dan 
Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120101927_pf.html 
(describing conflict between career and political staff in Civil Rights Division in voting rights case).  
The IG’s report sharply criticizes Bradley Schlozman, who served in various senior positions, 
including Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Division, for improperly considering political or 
ideological affiliations in hiring career attorneys, assigning individual cases, and forcing the transfer 
of three appellate attorneys, but it does not focus generally on the broader complaint that career 
supervisors were either demoted or otherwise removed from the decisionmaking process.  See OFFICE 
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN 
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS 
IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 33–35, 42–43, 45 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf.  The report concluded with a criminal referral to 
determine whether criminal charges would be warranted in light of Mr. Schlozman’s statements to 
Congress.  Id. at 63. 
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Finally, it is important to recognize that there may be far less difference than I 
have assumed in the ambitions of presidential appointees and career nonpartisan 
U.S. Attorneys.279  A U.S. Attorney, however appointed, has the opportunity to be 
involved in high profile cases and to develop the kinds of contacts and name 
recognition that could pave the way to elective office or a judicial appointment.  
Accordingly, a politically ambitious young lawyer might seek a “career” 
appointment as an AUSA and then U.S. Attorney in the hopes that it would 
provide a platform for a later elective office or judicial appointment.  And an 
attorney who had no political ambitions when he or she joined the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office and was promoted to U.S. Attorney might develop such aspirations after 
serving for some time as U.S. Attorney.  The possibility that some “career” U.S. 
Attorneys would have or develop such ambitions further weakens the case for 
restructuring the selection process as a means of eliminating partisan politics from 
prosecutorial decisionmaking. 
 
B. The Value of Localizing Federal Prosecution 
 
The issue of presidential appointment is inevitably bound up with the question 
whether to further unify and centralize federal prosecution.  Since its inception, 
one of the hallmarks of the federal criminal justice system has been that it is 
administered at the district level by prosecutors and judges drawn from that 
district.280  This system is consistent with the design of the U.S. Constitution and 
with the norms that govern the administration of criminal law in the United States.  
Federal criminal law is the exception, rather than the rule.  It is the states, rather 
than the federal government, that have general police powers.  Moreover states 
have deliberately dispersed and fragmented the power to investigate and prosecute 
crime so that this authority is administered at the local level.  For example, there 
are presently more than 2,300 prosecutors’ offices in the United States, and most 
of those prosecutors are elected.281  The tradition of popular local control of the 
administration of criminal justice has deep historical roots.282  This tradition 
reflects a recognition of the significant differences between individual 
communities and the belief that local control serves as a safeguard against 
administrative misuse of authority.283 
 
                                                                                                                            
279 Both Rachel and Tony Barkow drew this important point to my attention. 
280 See generally supra notes 221–31 and accompanying text. 
281 STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS: 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 1, 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (reporting there were 2,344 prosecutors’ offices and 
these offices were headed by elected chief prosecutors in all states except Alaska, Connecticut, the 
District of Columbia, and New Jersey). 
282 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(b) (3d ed. 2007). 
283 Id. 
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The structure of the federal criminal justice system has respected the states 
and the local communities within the states, allowing federal criminal laws to be 
administered in a fashion that is tailored to those local communities and their 
needs.  Like the states, the federal system has fragmented and dispersed the 
authority to prosecute crimes.  Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal criminal 
law has been administered at the district level, and federal judicial districts have 
been comprised of individual states or, when the population is sufficient, portions 
of a single state.284  Like federal district judges, the U.S. Attorneys are nearly 
always drawn from within the judicial district,285 and the political character of their 
appointment serves, to some degree, as a proxy for their connection to the values 
and priorities of that district.  Indeed, what appears to be an anomaly viewed from 
the perspective of the federal bureaucracy mimics the local political control of 
elected prosecutors at the state and local level.286  Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys 
practice within that district, in front of the local district judges and local juries, 
where they are generally opposed by the local defense bar as well as the federal 
public defender for the district.  The system of regulating legal practice at the state 
level287 reinforces this local orientation.  Indeed, the local rules in many districts 
require membership in that state’s bar as a prerequisite for membership in the bar 
of the district court, though they may exempt some or all attorneys representing the 
United States.288  These structural features have persisted, despite the centralization 
                                                                                                                            
284 See generally supra text accompanying notes 123–25. 
285 See supra text accompanying note 275.  There are occasional exceptions, most recently the 
high profile appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.  
Fitzgerald’s appointment was sponsored by his home-state senator, who favored experienced 
prosecutors from other federal districts for all three U.S. Attorney’s positions in Illinois.  See 
Fitzgerald’s Finest Achievement, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2002, at 8 (praising Sen. Peter Fitzgerald for 
sponsoring Patrick Fitzgerald and two other nominees who had “no ties to the state's giant law firms 
or political power structure to serve as U.S. attorney, the most important corruption-fighting position 
in government”). 
286 I thank Dan Richman for bringing this point to my attention. 
287 See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 
1.17 (3d ed. Supp. 2007). 
288 For examples of local rules that limit membership in the bar of the district court to 
attorneys admitted to practice in that state but allowing government attorneys to practice before the 
court without meeting this requirement, see, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOC. R. 83.1(a)(1) & (c); N.D. ALA. 
LOC. R. 83.1(a); W.D. N.C. LOC. R. 83.1(C); W.D. VA. LOC. R. III, Att’y Admiss. (1) & (6).   
There is considerable variation in the local rules.  The rules of some districts seem to place the 
local U.S. Attorney’s Office in the role of gatekeeper in determining whether other attorneys for the 
government should be permitted to appear in the district court without meeting all of the standard 
rules for an appearance pro hac vice.  See, e.g., D. MISS. LOC. R. 83.1(A)(3) (allowing attorneys 
representing the United States, its agencies, or employees to appear in the district court without being 
admitted “upon proper introduction to the court by the United States Attorney for this district or one 
of the United States Attorney’s assistants”); E.D. VA. LOC. R. 83.1(A) & (D) (providing that 
members of the Virginia state bar are eligible to practice in the district, allowing “foreign attorneys” 
to appear pro hac vice when accompanied by a member of the bar of the district court, but exempting 
from this requirement “[f]ederal government attorneys appearing pursuant to the authority of the 
United States Attorney’s Office,” and noting specifically that other attorneys for the Department of 
2009] RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS  
 
423 
of authority described in Part II.  Indeed, the need to rely on and partner with state 
and local investigators to develop many kinds of federal cases cuts strongly against 
central control.289  In particular, federal prosecutors are heavily dependent upon 
state and local investigators for many of the gun and drug prosecutions that now 
make up such a large part of the federal caseload.290  In effect, the U.S. Attorneys 
are embedded in the “local legal-political economy,”291 and their dependence on 
local information networks promotes decentralization. 
The present federal system is a hybrid.  The substantive laws, the rules of 
criminal procedure,292 and the sentencing guidelines293 are national, but they are 
applied by U.S. Attorneys (as well as district judges and defense lawyers) who are 
drawn from a single state or a subdivision within a state.  The structure of the 
system provides a mechanism for some adaptation or amelioration of federal laws 
that may be ill-suited to the conditions—or the norms—of particular districts.  But 
there are also mechanisms within the Department of Justice and within the judicial 
system for harmonization, and, when necessary, for the enforcement of uniform 
standards and procedures.  Indeed, the present system allows a healthy dialogue on 
the question when uniformity is necessary and when variation should be 
permitted.294  Since 9/11 uniformity and centralized control have been favored for 
                                                                                                                            
Justice must secure local counsel). 
Other district court rules eschew the local orientation, allowing an attorney admitted to practice 
in any state or in any federal district to be admitted to practice in that district.  See, e.g., S.D. ILL. 
LOC. R. 83.1(a) (admitted in any state); W.D. N.Y. LOC. R. 83.1(f) (admitted in any United States 
District Court and the state bar in which that district is located). 
There is some doubt about the validity of local rules that would restrict the attorneys who may 
represent the United States in the district courts.  The Department of Justice has taken the position 
that such provisions are inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (2007).  Telephone Interview with Colm 
Connolly, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Del. (Jan. 8, 2009). 
289 Richman, supra note 61, at 1396. 
290 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, CHANGING FACE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING 1, 9 tbl.4 
(2008) (noting increase in drug trafficking, immigration, fraud, and firearms cases accounted for 
91.8% of the increase in the caseload from 1991 to 2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/general/20081230_Changing_Face_Fed_Sent.pdf. 
291 Richman, supra note 61, at 1405. 
292 The Sumners Courts Act, 76 Pub. L. No. 675, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940), authorized the 
development and promulgation of national rules of procedure for criminal cases, and the first Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure were subsequently adopted by order of the Supreme Court on December 
26, 1944, and took effect on March 21, 1946.  See generally George H. Dession, The New Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 694–96 (1946). 
293 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), created the United States Sentencing 
Commission and authorized it to promulgate national sentencing guidelines.  For a general discussion 
of the origins of the Commission and the guidelines, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 
(1989) (holding that the guidelines the Commission promulgated did not violate principle of 
separation of powers).  
294 For an excellent discussion of the related question of the level at which discretion should be 
exercised in individual cases, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 239. 
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terrorism related prosecutions, and that is not likely to change.295  But other issues 
are open to debate.  For example, some U.S. Attorneys have opposed the 
centralization of the death penalty approval process, which now permits the 
Department of Justice to override the U.S. Attorney’s recommendation not to seek 
death.296  It seems likely that subsequent administrations will revisit this issue. 
Indeed, sentencing in non-capital cases provides an excellent example of the 
degree to which local federal districts have retained a distinct character.  Although 
the Sentencing Reform Act297 was adopted twenty-five years ago to eliminate 
unwarranted sentencing disparity, there are still wide variations from district to 
district on such measures as the percentage of defendants sentenced within the 
Guideline range and the percentage who receive sentences below the range over 
the opposition of the government support.298  These figures reflect more than just 
variations in the practices or attitudes of the district judges (or the courts of 
appeal).299  There are also equally wide variations in government practices and the 
sentencing factors controlled by the government.300  This is particularly apparent in 
the statistics concerning sentencing reductions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which may 
be awarded only upon the government’s motion to defendants who have provided 
“substantial assistance” in the prosecution of others.301  There are districts that 
                                                                                                                            
295 Daniel C. Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutors—Looking Back and Looking 
Forward, 58 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming May 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289434. 
296 Glaberson, supra note 189, at A1. 
297 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
298 In 2007, for example, nationwide 60.8% of defendants were sentenced within the 
applicable Guidelines range.  U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, 
DISTRICT & CIRCUIT, OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm.  But many districts varied substantially from that 
average.  Fewer than fifty percent of the defendants were sentenced within range in thirteen districts, 
and more than eighty percent of defendants were sentenced within range in ten other districts.  Id. 
299 The departure rates among the courts of appeals vary widely.  See NORMAN ABRAMS & 
SARA SUN BEALE, 2008 SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 239–44 
(comparing departure rates in selected circuits before and after Supreme Court’s 2007 decisions in 
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough); Paul J. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons after Koon v. U.S., 9 
FED. SENT’G. REP. 284, 286 (1997) (noting that circuits developed different sentencing personas and 
considering how different circuits responded to Supreme Court’s decision in Koon).  The Circuits that 
Hofer et al. found to have the highest departure rates in 1997, the Ninth and the Second, see id. at 
286–87, continued to have high rates in 2007.  See U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY POST-
KIMBROUGH/GALL DATA REPORT, tbls. 1-DC, 1-9 (2008), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/USSC_Kimbrough_Gall_Report_September_08_Final.pdf. 
300 U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT & CIRCUIT, 
OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007), available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm. 
301 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2008) provides: 
§5K1.1.  Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement) 
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed 
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typically have very low rates of substantial assistance departures and other districts 
where more than a third of all defendants receive such government sponsored 
downward departures.302  As these statistics indicate, each district has its own 
character, which reflects not only the law enforcement situation in the district, but 
also the attitudes and practices of both the district judges and the U.S. Attorneys 
Office.  A 1998 study by the staff of the Sentencing Commission confirmed this 
point, finding wide variations among U.S. Attorneys Offices regarding their 
practices concerning substantial assistance departures.303  Similar differences in 
from district to district exist on many other prosecutorial practices that have a 
significant bearing on sentences.304 
 
                                                                                                                            
an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines. 
(a)     The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that 
may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: 
(1)     the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the 
defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s 
evaluation of the assistance rendered; 
(2)     the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or 
testimony provided by the defendant; 
(3)     the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance; 
(4)     any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or 
his family resulting from his assistance; 
(5)     the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance. 
302 There were downward departures in 35.7% of the cases in the Southern District of Ohio, 
and 3.3% in the District of New Mexico.  U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
BY STATE, DISTRICT & CIRCUIT, OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm.  In comparison, the national average was 
14.4%.  Id.  In the six districts in which prosecutors were the most generous with substantial 
assistance motions, more than one third of defendants received downward departures for their 
cooperation.  Id. (D. D.C., E.D. Pa., M.D. Pa., E.D. Ky., S.D. Ohio, and M.D. Ala.).  In twenty-four 
other districts fewer than ten percent of defendants received such departures.  Id. (D. P.R., D. R.I., 
E.D. Va., W.D. Va., N.D. W. Va., S.D. W. Va., E.D. La., S.D. Miss., S.D. Tex., W.D. Tex., S.D. Ill., 
W.D. Wis., D. Neb., D. S.D., D. Alaska, D. Ariz., S.D. Cal., E.D. Wash., D. N.M., W.D. Okla., D. 
Utah, D. Wyo., S.D. Ga., D. Del.). 
303 LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUBSTANTIAL 
ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 8–9, 10 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf (finding 
disagreement among districts regarding appropriateness availability of substantial assistance 
departure when a defendant provides information concerning his or her own behavior and a lack of 
uniformly applied criteria for determining when assistance was substantial).  For an argument that the 
Department of Justice’s failure to manage the unilateral authority to move for substantial assistance 
created a judicial backlash, see Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of 
Judicial Revolt on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial 
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7 (1999). 
304 See, e.g., Statement of District Judge Robert L. Hinkle Before the U.S. Sentencing 
Comm’n, Atlanta, Ga. 2–3, 6 (Feb. 11, 2009) 
http://www.ussc.gov/agendas/20090210/Hinkle_statement.pdf (noting variation from district to 
district in whether prosecutors apply relevant conduct broadly or narrowly and whether they always 
file notice of a defendant’s prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 851). 
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The existence of such wide variations from district to district is not a recent 
phenomenon.  Since the introduction of the Guidelines, sentences in some districts 
have been more lenient than the national averages, and leniency has persisted 
despite various statutory and administrative efforts to increase uniformity.305  This 
variation might be seen as a problem, or even a failure, of the Guidelines system.306  
But in my view these district variations—which have been almost exclusively 
tipped in favor of leniency—have been desirable.  Perhaps that would not have 
been so if we had achieved perfection in our national laws and policies and needed 
only to bring the final recalcitrant districts into line.  But that is not the case.  In the 
first place, there are inevitable gaps and gaffs in any large system, and that is most 
assuredly true of the hodgepodge of federal criminal laws and the relatively new 
system of the federal Sentencing Guidelines.  More important, there are systemic 
problems with our politics and the resulting policies at the national level.  What 
critics have called the pathological politics of crime and hyper-punitiveness have 
been ascendant at the national level, as Congress has reaped the political benefits 
of repeatedly expanding federal criminal law and increasing its severity.307  Federal 
criminal sentences have been repeatedly ratcheted up, and the federal prison 
population has expanded astronomically.308  In the view of many, the pendulum 
has swung too far, but it is difficult to find a way to turn the dials back under the 
glare of the national spotlight.  Within some districts, however, the political 
temperature is lower, and local attitudes do not demand (or perhaps support) 
sentences at the highest levels.  These attitudes may affect offenses across the 
board, or they may affect only certain classes of offenses or offenders.  The same 
                                                                                                                            
305 For a discussion of the legislative and administrative efforts to restrict the discretion of 
individual prosecutors in the context of sentencing, see supra text accompanying notes 195–98. 
306 Variations among the districts might seem to be inconsistent with one of the chief goals of 
the Sentencing Reform Act, which was to eliminate the “great variation among sentences imposed by 
different judges on similarly situated offenders.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 
(1989).  Moreover, lower sentences might reflect the desire of individual federal prosecutors or U.S. 
Attorneys’ Offices to reduce their workload by discounting the “price” of a federal conviction, and 
measures aimed at preventing such discounts could be intended to force prosecutors to work harder to 
prepare their cases.  See Richman, supra note 61, at 1400 (citing statement of Professor Frank 
Bowman). 
307 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001) (describing pathological forces in crime politics); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with 
It?: The Political, Social, Psychological, and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development 
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.  23, 40–44 (1997) (describing politicization of 
federal criminal justice policy); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice 
Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 405–08, 
410–12 (2006) (describing increase in punitiveness in the U.S., finding the U.S. more punitive than 
other Western nations, and relating changes to news media’s increasing focus on crime). 
308 See Beale, supra note 168, at 761–65 (describing sentence severity in federal system); The 
Sentencing Project, The Federal Prison Population: A Statistical Analysis, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_federalprisonpop.pdf (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting that the number of federal prisoners increased by eighty-one percent 
between 1995 and 2003). 
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attitudes may also be reflected in parallel developments in state law and sentencing 
practices. 
In effect, the present system enhances the authority of locally anchored U.S. 
Attorneys and reinforces the historic district-oriented structure of both the federal 
courts and federal prosecutors.  This has reinforced federalism, providing a 
structure in which some local norms and practices can survive, and 
experimentation can occur.  Converting the U.S. Attorneys to career nonpartisan 
employees would shift power from the districts to Washington, disturbing the 
balance between the local and national. 
 
C. Effective Administration 
 
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would also 
affect the day-to-day administration of federal criminal law in a variety of 
significant ways.  Redefining the character of the position would make it more 
attractive to some candidates and less attractive to others, change the public and 
professional perception of the position, alter the frequency with which U.S. 
Attorneys would be replaced, and spotlight the difficulty of defining effective 
measures of performance.  Finally, making the U.S. Attorney a career employee 
would reduce democratic accountability and make it more difficult to remove a 
U.S. Attorney who was ineffective. 
It seems clear that changing the character of the position would change the 
types of individuals who would serve.  As noted above, there would be benefits to 
appointing U.S. Attorneys who did not have their own political ambitions.  But it is 
also true that some of the most distinguished lawyers who have served as U.S. 
Attorneys would have had no interest in a career position.  There is widespread 
agreement that a presidential appointment carries with it a great deal of prestige, 
and that the loss of this prestige would be seen as effectively demoting the 
position.  That perception would likely be sharpened if the change were 
accompanied by further centralization of authority within the Department.  In 
seeking to carry out her duties as the chief law enforcement official within the 
district, a U.S. Attorney who is a presidential appointee may draw on both the 
prestige of her position and her preexisting professional and political base within 
her district.  The high profile and politically active candidates currently drawn to 
the position of U.S. Attorney may have an advantage in seeking to coordinate the 
various federal agencies with state and local officials, many of whom are elected 
officials.  This is particularly valuable because the rapid expansion of federal 
criminal law into areas largely left to state enforcement has made cooperation with 
state investigative agencies and prosecutors absolutely essential.309  A nonpartisan 
                                                                                                                            
309 For example, the expanding federal efforts to prosecute violent crime depend upon the local 
police, because federal agents cannot patrol the streets, do not receive 911 calls, and rarely infiltrate 
gangs.  Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & 
JUST. 377, 406 (2006).  The federal emphasis on terrorism prosecutions has increased the reliance on 
states investigative resources, both to coordinate with federal investigators in terrorism investigations 
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career employee heading the U.S. Attorneys Office runs the risk of being 
dismissed as a mere bureaucrat.310  The preference for candidates from within the 
district that is inherent in the current system also favors candidates likely to have 
good contacts and working relationships with state and local law enforcement 
personnel.  This is especially important because federal prosecutors must depend 
heavily on local investigators in certain kinds of cases. 
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would 
likely result in U.S. Attorneys holding their posts for longer periods.  This would 
have both advantages and disadvantages.  It is traditional for every U.S. Attorney 
to be replaced when a new president is elected, and many U.S. Attorneys do not 
serve a full four year term.  The periodic turnover in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices 
results in a loss of continuity, as well as substantial transition costs.  Those costs 
could be avoided by defining the position.  On the other hand, the president’s 
ability to appoint—and remove—U.S. Attorneys helps each administration to 
enforce its agenda and priorities.  Additionally, some scholars have expressed 
concern that the increasing tenure of AUSAs may diminish their work ethic and 
productivity over time, leading to an accumulation of dead wood.  The same might 
easily be true for a long serving U.S. Attorney, who might come to view the 
position as a secure sinecure.  The present system provides each new U.S. Attorney 
with an incentive to make her mark during her relatively brief tenure.  Moreover, 
given the increased tenure of AUSAs,311 each new U.S. Attorney is assured of 
having a stable of experienced assistants. 
Because most presidential appointees do not come from within the U.S. 
Attorney’s Offices, the traditional system of political appointments can also serve 
other important values, promoting fairness and avoiding wrongful convictions.  
Research on the causes of wrongful convictions has produced a large body of 
scholarship describing the problem of “tunnel vision,” the unconscious cognitive 
biases that plague both police and prosecutors.312  Ironically, there is evidence that 
                                                                                                                            
and to make up for the diversion of federal investigators from other kinds of cases.  Id. at 407–16; 
ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 176, at 126–29 (describing diversion of federal resources and apparent 
increase in drug prosecutions based upon state and local investigations). 
310 On the other hand, Ronald Goldstock has suggested that the organized crime strike forces, 
which were headed by career prosecutors, functioned very effectively during the last few years before 
they were eliminated, and the career prosecutors who headed these offices were able to forge very 
effective working relationships with state and local officials.  Telephone Interview with Ronald 
Goldstock, Former Director, New York State Organized Crime Task Force, 1981–94 (Feb. 19, 2009). 
311 See supra text accompanying notes 213–19. 
312 I thank Bruce Green for drawing this point to my attention.  For an excellent introduction to 
the problem of tunnel vision in criminal cases, see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple 
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291.  See also Alafair S. Burke, 
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) 
(discussing strategies that might help prosecutors overcome cognitive biases in discretionary 
matters); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (stating that four cognitive biases affect prosecutor’s 
decision-making: confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance and the 
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these biases become stronger, rather than weaker, as prosecutors gain experience, 
and that they affect even prosecutors who are most committed to the ideal of doing 
justice.313  The structure of the U.S. adversarial system exacerbates these natural 
biases because prosecutors have constant interaction with the police, victims, and 
prosecution witnesses, but little contact with the defendant, his family and friends, 
and defense counsel.314  This encourages empathy and loyalty within the 
prosecution team but isolation from—and often negative attitudes toward—the 
defense.315  As a result, unconscious biases distort the prosecutor’s processing of 
information regarding guilt or innocence.  The promotion of AUSAs to be career 
U.S. Attorneys would do nothing to address these problems, but the periodic 
presidential appointment of U.S. Attorneys brings in new leadership with diverse 
experiences, frequently including some experience doing criminal defense work.  
This aspect of the selection process brings the federal system closer to the English 
system of having barristers represent both the prosecution and the defense.316  
Additionally, appointing U.S. Attorneys from private practice may also bring in 
other skills and talents, including familiarity with the management of a large law 
firm and the innovative use of technology.  Since management is one of the U.S. 
Attorney’s major responsibilities, experience of this nature outside the government 
could be quite helpful.  
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would 
reduce democratic accountability by severing the direct link between the U.S. 
Attorney and the president.  This would make it significantly more difficult for a 
new administration to enforce its policies and priorities, because it is notoriously 
difficult to alter the practices of a large bureaucracy.  Moreover, the power to 
appoint and remove officials is a critical element in creating and enforcing political 
accountability,317 and that political accountability provides a means of checking the 
very forms of prosecutorial abuse that are of greatest concern.  Justice Scalia made 
this point in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson: 
 
Under our system of government, the primary check against 
prosecutorial abuse is a political one.  The prosecutors who exercise this 
awesome discretion are selected and can be removed by a President, 
                                                                                                                            
avoidance of cognitive dissonance). 
313 Findley & Scott, supra note 312, at 327–31. 
314 Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW. 
L.J. 475, 486–87, 490 (2006). 
315 Id. at 490. 
316 Cf. George C. Thomas, III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the 
Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice System, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 25, 44–47 (suggesting reform of 
U.S. adversarial system based on practice of British barristers and judge advocates in U.S. military 
justice system who represent both prosecution and defense). 
317 For a classic discussion of this point, see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The 
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994). 
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whom the people have trusted enough to elect.  Moreover, when crimes 
are not investigated and prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a 
reasonable sense of proportion, the President pays the cost in political 
damage to his administration.  If federal prosecutors “pick people that 
[they] thin[k] [they] should get, rather than cases that need to be 
prosecuted,” if they amass many more resources against a particular 
prominent individual, or against a particular class of political protesters, 
or against members of a particular political party, than the gravity of the 
alleged offenses or the record of successful prosecutions seems to 
warrant, the unfairness will come home to roost in the Oval Office.318  
 
Justice Scalia would likely argue that furor created by the U.S. Attorney firings 
and the Congressional investigations into claims of prosecutorial abuse prove his 
point. 
Appointing career U.S. Attorneys would also go hand in hand with 
centralizing more authority in Main Justice.  Although the Bush administration’s 
removal of the U.S. Attorneys was extraordinarily haphazard and unprofessional, 
the Department has attempted to develop effective systems for reviewing the 
performance of each U.S. Attorneys Office.  Unfortunately, few good performance 
measures have been devised, and there is a great danger of reliance on crude 
measures that emphasize quantity rather than quality.319  The present system 
responds to these problems in two ways.  First, it creates a direct link between each 
U.S. Attorney and the administration that has appointed her, increasing the 
likelihood that she shares the administration’s values and priorities.  Second, it 
limits the damage that a poorly performing U.S. Attorney can do, since she can be 
removed by the president, and, in any event, will leave office at the end of the 
administration.  Redefining the position as one subject to civil service type 
protections, in contrast, would make the removal of a U.S. Attorney who did not 
perform well extremely difficult. 
 
                                                                                                                            
318 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But see Kahan, 
supra note 64, at 487 (arguing that the Department of Justice “lacks the adequate political incentives 
to check individual U.S. Attorneys, especially once they have initiated sensational prosecutions”). 
319 See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 615 (2005) (noting the 
general tension between measures of quality and quantity).  For example, a U.S. Attorney may have 
the choice of bringing several quick and easy gun prosecutions based on the work of local police or 
one complex fraud case that will require a grand jury investigation and substantial prosecutorial 
resources.  David Richman, Response, Judging Untried Cases: In response to Trial Distortion and the 
end of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 223 (2007); 
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007/richman.pdf.  There has been substantial criticism of 
the Department’s terrorism case statistics; critics claim the Department includes a large number of 
minor cases with little or no connection to terrorism.  See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of 
Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data In Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and 
“Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 873–76 (2007). 
2009] RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS  
 
431 
D. Other Mechanisms to Buffer Political Influences 
 
It would take a very strong case to bring about change in the present system of 
appointing U.S. Attorneys, because both the president and the Senate benefit.  
Given the value of lodging authority at the district level and the administrative 
advantages of the current system, it is difficult to argue that the case has been made 
for converting the position of U.S. Attorney to a nonpartisan career appointment.  
Because the danger of improper political influences is nonetheless real, the better 
course is to find mechanisms to prevent or at least mute the worst of the political 
pressures that have been brought to bear on U.S. Attorneys from time to time.    
Although I do not favor restricting the president’s removal power, three other 
options seem promising: screening or nominations panels, restrictions on contact 
between U.S. Attorneys and political officials, and clarifying and perhaps 
restricting the scope of the offenses used to prosecute state and local corruption. 
 
1. Limitations on removal 
 
Although this article begins with a focus on the firing of U.S. Attorneys, I do 
not advocate limiting the president’s authority to remove a U.S. Attorney.  To 
some degree, this is simply one consequence of my position that the U.S. 
Attorneys should remain presidential appointees.320  In my view, the president 
should have the authority to appoint individuals who share his administration’s 
priorities and to remove a U.S. Attorney, such as Carol Lamm, who fails to follow 
those priorities. 
In addition, two factors have changed the landscape, reducing the likelihood 
that the president will remove U.S. Attorneys for improper reasons or that U.S. 
Attorneys will feel threatened by the possibility of removal.  The first change is the 
repeal of the short lived provision giving the Attorney General the unilateral 
authority to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney.  Because the president’s power to 
appoint a replacement is now subject to the counterweight of Senate confirmation, 
the temptation to remove a U.S. Attorney for improper reasons has been reduced.  
The second factor is the firestorm of controversy that the Bush Administration’s 
actions aroused.  Future presidents know that they will not have the unfettered 
choice of a replacement and that the removal of a U.S. Attorney will be closely 
scrutinized.  Indeed, one way of reading the events described here is as a success 
story: as a result of public outcry the system corrected itself.  These factors seem 
likely to have a major effect on the calculus of all of the actors, at least in the near 
future.321  
                                                                                                                            
320 But see Weiss, supra note 260, at 348–63 (arguing that Congress possesses the 
constitutional authority to restrain the president's removal of U.S. Attorneys, and proposing 
legislation that would require a report of the grounds for removal and provide removed U.S. Attorney 
with a cause of action to challenge her removal). 
321 Indeed, some concern has been expressed that the future presidents will be unduly deterred 
from removing U.S. Attorneys whose performance is substandard.  I do not view this as a serious 
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2. Nominating or screening panels 
 
A more promising option is the use of nominating or screening panels.  These 
panels could serve a number of valuable purposes, depending upon how they were 
structured.  There are many models of selection panels for judges,322 and bills 
including merit selection commissions were introduced in Congress in the late 
1970s.323  Senators in nine states currently use panels to recommend candidates for 
judicial vacancies, and in three states the same panels recommend U.S. Attorney 
candidates.324  A system in which a commission or panel presents a slate of 
potential nominees for the consideration of the president can buffer the U.S. 
Attorney to some degree from her political masters (both the president and the 
home state senators), and it might also open the selection process up to candidates 
of substantial professional accomplishment who lack strong political ties to the 
administration.  Yet the final choice would remain that of the president (who may 
consider political factors),325 and the U.S. Attorney would retain the prestige and 
                                                                                                                            
concern because prior administrations very seldom found it necessary to remove U.S. Attorneys 
before the end of their term.  See supra text accompanying notes 240–44. 
322 See generally THE AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (2008), 
available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/MJSP_web.pdf. (providing a detailed merit selection 
plan for judges and commentary on the practices of existing merit selection commissions).  In 2008, 
the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a resolution recommending the 
establishment of bipartisan panels to nominate candidates for the federal judiciary.  See Amanda 
Bronstad, Cooling off Judicial Selections: Push for Bipartisan Panels Debated, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 
2008, at 1. 
323 Two bills introduced in 1978, H.R. 10514, 95th Cong. (1978) and H.R. 12654, 95th Cong. 
(1978), revised the selection process for U.S. Attorneys, creating strong merit selection commissions.  
These bills were in response to the Carter administration’s removal of U.S. Attorney David W. 
Marston after its initial endorsement of merit selection.  See Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 48 (1978) (statements of Griffin Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States, and Rep. Tom Railsback); see also Editorial, On the Selection of U.S. Attorneys, 61 
JUDICATURE 396, 396 (1978) (discussing Marston’s removal and merit selection of U.S. Attorneys). 
324 AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/federal_judicial_selection/federal_judicial_nominating_commissions.
cfm?state=FD (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (describing nominating commissions in California, 
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin) [hereinafter 
AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION].  The panels in California, Florida, and Washington recommend 
candidates for U.S. Attorney.  See id. (describing California panels); Florida Federal Judicial 
Nominating Commission, Rules of Procedure, Revised August 2007, available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/FL_FJNC__rules_69517EF8A0D80.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Florida Nominating Commission]; Wisconsin Federal Nominating 
Charter, available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/WI_charter_D88C3BA6A5469.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Wisconsin Nominating Charter]. 
325 Indeed, the president could even be given the option of making a selection not included on 
the list.  See, e.g., H.R. 11018, 95th Cong. (1978) (creating a merit selection commission to propose 
nominees for U.S. district judge, U.S. Attorney, and U.S. marshal but suggesting only that the 
President “be guided by the list”). 
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authority that comes with a presidential appointment.  The process also retains 
senatorial influence at the confirmation stage.326   
Moreover, the makeup of the selection panel can be fine tuned to increase or 
decrease the influence of the president and home state senators.  The authority to 
name the members of the selection panel could be lodged in either the president or 
the home state senators.  Restrictions may be imposed on the makeup of the panel, 
such as a requirement that there be a balance in political party affiliation.327  The 
panels could also include individuals with key perspectives on the appointment, 
such as the local chief judge, the outgoing U.S. Attorney, and/or members 
representing the state bar.328 
The nominating panels presently in use by various senators demonstrate some 
of the options.  Most, but not all, of the commissions were established by and 
report to both senators.329  California is unusual.  Each senator has appointed her 
own commission, and they will alternate in screening, interviewing, and 
recommending candidates for federal judgeships as well as for U.S. Attorney and 
U.S. marshal.330  Most of the panels operate statewide, but again California is 
unusual in having separate panels for each judicial district.331  Florida has a single 
statewide commission, but it is made up of three conferences that correspond to the 
federal judicial districts.332  The panels vary widely in size, having as few as six or 
as many as fifty-six members.333  In most cases, the senators appoint all members 
of the panels, but there are exceptions, including the inclusion of some members to 
                                                                                                                            
326 But cf. supra note 258, at 218 (proposal of former U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour 
to have the president select U.S. Attorneys from a list proposed by a circuit-wide nominating 
committee but not to make the positions subject to Senate confirmation). 
327 See, e.g., H.R. 10514, 95th Cong. (1978) (“No more than three members of each 
commission may be members of the same political affiliation”); H.R. 12654, 95th Cong. (1978) 
(same). 
328 Cf. Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 98 
(1978) (statement of Rep. John B. Anderson) (suggesting that U.S. Attorney nominating panel could 
include outgoing U.S. Attorney, individuals appointed by the chief judge of the federal judicial 
circuit, the chief judge of the federal district court, bar associations, and the Governor). 
329 In Colorado, Senator Salazar uses a nominating commission, but Senator Udall does not.  
AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 324. 
330 Id. (describing California process announced in early 2009). 
331 Id. 
332 Florida Nominating Commission, supra note 324, Rules 6–10.  All members of the state 
wide commission receive and rank all applicants, and after consideration of the rankings, the 
conference in question invites candidates for interviews, deliberates in closed session, and then 
certifies no fewer than three applicants per vacancy.  Id. Rules 17, 21–24.  The chair of the statewide 
commission is a member of each of the conferences.  Id. Rule 6. 
333 The smallest panels are found in Georgia and Washington, which have six members, and 
Colorado, which has eight.  The largest are Florida, with 56 members, and Texas, which has varied 
from 28 to 40 members since its inception in 1986.  AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 
324. 
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be named by the state bar334 and mechanisms that account for the lack of a senator 
from the president=s party.335  The panels in Colorado and Washington are 
bipartisan.336  In most states the panels provide a slate of names to the senators, but 
in Colorado it appears that the nominating commission forwards its 
recommendations directly to the White House.337  There are also other variations, 
including Florida=s requirement that all application materials be available to the 
public and that interviews be open to the public.338  
Screening or rating panels, on the other hand, would provide less of a 
restriction on the president and the home state senators, since these panels would 
not generate a field of candidates.  Screening panels would, however, provide 
some greater assurance of the U.S. Attorneys’ professional experience and 
reputation,339 and increasing the visibility of the appointment in the local 
professional community may strengthen the U.S. Attorney’s ability to occasionally 
resist pressures from Main Justice.  The American Bar Association’s screening of 
judicial nominations provides one model that could be adapted to the nomination 
of U.S. Attorneys.340 
The use of screening or nomination panels has another advantage: they can be 
(and have been) employed in individual districts without any legislative 
authorization.341  This is consistent with the approach advocated here of allowing 
variations among judicial districts, and use in individual districts can provide a 
                                                                                                                            
334 Both Hawaii and Wisconsin provide for members designated by the state bar association, 
and Wisconsin also includes the dean of one of the state’s law schools.  Id.  
335 Hawaii’s charter provides that when neither senator is a member of the president’s party, 
the panel shall consist of eight members: two selected by the state=s senior senator, one by the state’s 
junior senator, one by the state bar, and four chosen by the highest ranking member of the president’s 
party.  Hawaii Federal Judicial Selection Commission, § 2, available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/HI_FJSC_charter_DFA1FE5BF22BE.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2009).  If, however, the state’s senators are from the president’s party, the 
commission expands to nine members, with four chosen by the senior senator, three by the junior 
senator, and two by the state bar.  Wisconsin’s commission charter makes provision for three 
possibilities: both senators of a different party than the president, both of the same party as the 
president, and one senator from the president’s party.  Wisconsin Nominating Charter, supra note 
324. 
336 AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 324. 
337 Id. 
338 Florida Nominating Commission, supra note 324, Rule 23. 
339 Upon occasion, U.S. Attorneys with little or no litigation experience have been appointed.  
See supra note 268. 
340 For a description of the ABA process, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (2007), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federal_judiciary07.pdf. 
341 For example, in 2001 the Bush administration and California’s two Democratic senators, 
Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, agreed to develop a bipartisan selection process for judges and 
U.S. Attorneys that would avoid protracted nomination fights.  See Richard B. Schmitt, Justice Aide 
Took Lead to Replace Prosecutor, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR 
9647884 (describing the commission and Monica Goodling’s attempt to circumvent it). 
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base of experience that might ultimately guide legislation on a national level.  In 
the absence of legislative change, it would be very desirable for more senators to 
experiment with the use of such panels to assist in the selection of U.S. Attorneys 
and for scholars to study the operation of the existing panels.  Additionally, 
professional groups, such as the ABA and the American Judicature Society, should 
consider recommending legislation to require the use of either nominating or 
screening panels. 
 
3. Regulating contact between individual federal prosecutors and political 
actors 
 
Regardless of the system of appointing U.S. Attorneys, renewed attention 
should be given to regulating the contacts between the U.S. Attorney (and their 
staffs) and various political actors, both within and outside of the administration in 
which they serve.  Since the post-Watergate period, the Department has had 
internal regulations intended to insulate its decision making from improper 
influences.  The regulations have become less stringent in some respects over time, 
and there is evidence that, in at least one significant case, they were not followed.  
More attention should be given to three issues: the persons within the Department 
who are authorized to speak to representatives of the White House and Congress 
concerning individual investigations and cases, the permissible nature of those 
conversations, and the mechanisms to ensure that the new standards are followed. 
For at least thirty years, the Department has had internal regulations that 
imposed limitation on communications with the White House and Congress.342  
These regulations are intended to insulate the U.S. Attorneys (and others) from 
influences that should not affect decisions in particular criminal or civil cases, to 
preserve the Department’s independence, and to prevent even the appearance of 
conflicts of interest.343  It is difficult to track the applicable policy precisely 
throughout the period in question, because it was incorporated into various 
versions of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual but also supplemented by a series of letters 
                                                                                                                            
342 I have not been able to locate the original policy.  The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual from 1984 
states that it is announcing and restating a policy announced in 1978.  See infra note 343. 
343 USAM, supra note 26, at § 1-8.200 provided: 
The Assistant Attorneys General, the U.S. Attorneys and the heads of the investigative 
agencies in the Department . . . must be insulated from influences that should not affect 
decisions in particular criminal or civil cases.  To ensure that this occurs, to continue the 
independence of the Department of Justice, to prevent even the appearance of conflicts of 
interest and to provide for the most efficient and effective system of proper 
communications with outside parties, specific procedures must be provided to regulate 
communication concerning pending cases.  Consequently, the following paragraphs 
restate and clarify the procedures initially announced in 1978. 
 
A. All inquiries and information concerning pending investigations, matters or cases from 
either the White House Staff or the Congress should be directed to the Offices of the 
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General. . . .  
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and memoranda from the Attorneys General.  Oversight hearings in the Senate 
revealed that at least from 1993 to 2002 the Attorney General’s written policy 
stringently limited contact between the White House and the Department 
concerning individual cases.344  Initial communications were authorized for only 
seven individuals: the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate 
Attorney General, the President, Vice President, White House Counsel, and 
Deputy White House Counsel.345  During the Bush Administration, however, 
successive revisions greatly expanded the group of individuals authorized to 
communicate concerning individual cases, first to 417 individuals in the White 
House and 42 in the Department, and later to 895 people in the White House and 
42 in the Department.346  On the Congressional side, the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual now provides that any Congressional inquiry to a U.S. Attorney seeking 
non-public information about individual cases must be referred to a designated 
congressional liaison, which is presently the counsel to the director of the 
Executive Office of United States Attorneys.347 
The new policies reflected the perception that limiting contact to only the 
senior Department leadership would create a bottleneck, and that such a bottleneck 
was especially problematic following 9/11.348  On the other hand, the relaxed 
policies allowed hundreds of individuals within Congress and the Executive 
Branch, whose duties are primarily or exclusively political, to have greater access 
to and contact with individuals who are making prosecutorial decisions.  They also 
allowed contacts at a lower level within the Department.  This can create the 
appearance of impropriety, undermining public confidence in the neutrality and 
impartiality of federal prosecutions.  It also increases the difficulty of making 
nuanced determinations about the propriety of providing information in individual 
cases. 
Because the Department’s publications were not amended to reflect the 
change in policy, these changes came to light only as a result of multiple inquiries 
in the course of Congressional oversight hearings.  Concern about the extent to 
                                                                                                                            
344 See S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 2–6 (2007) (describing hearings and findings); id. at 13–19 
(reproducing letter and memoranda from Attorneys General in 1994, 2002, and 2006).  The 2006 
memoranda were not incorporated into the published ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL.  Id. 
at 3.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL, § 32(1) (1998), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/doj00032.htm.   
345 See S. REP. NO. 110-203, supra note 344, at 2.  
346 Id. at 2–3, 14–19. 
347 USAM, supra note 26, at § 1-8.001 to .030, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/8mdoj.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 
2008). 
348 See The Role of the Department of Justice, http://www.acslaw.org/node/5208 (July 2007) 
(last visited on December 11, 2008) (video and transcript of an ACS National Convention Panel 
examining the historical relationship between the Justice Department, including statements by former 
Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick describing restrictive policy during the Clinton 
administration, and statements by Gorelick and Viet Dinh that policy changed in Bush administration, 
particularly following 9/11). 
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which disclosures were being permitted led the Senate Judiciary Committee to 
approve a bill that would require semi-annual reports to Congress describing which 
Department of Justice and White House personnel had communications regarding 
ongoing Departmental investigations or cases.349  Shortly thereafter, Attorney 
General Mukasey issued a new policy that limited initial communications 
regarding any specific criminal or civil matter to four individuals: the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Counsel to the President, and the 
Deputy Counsel to the President.350 
The problems noted in Parts I and II suggest the importance of tight controls 
on communications between those charged with making prosecutorial decisions in 
federal cases and those in Congress and the White House whose roles are political.  
Contacts should be limited to a smaller group of individuals who have significant 
stature and experience.  The Mukasey memorandum reinstitutes tight controls on 
communications by the White House as a matter of internal Departmental policy.  
It is unclear whether further safeguards are needed, given the unannounced 
amendment of the governing policy during the Bush administration.  Moreover, at 
this point it appears that the controls on the Congressional side of the equation may 
also deserve attention.  The director of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys is 
not a presidential appointee, nor is the counsel to the director.  Authorizing 
Congressional contacts at this level of the Department for communications 
concerning individual investigations or prosecutions is quite different than 
channeling all contacts through the senior leadership.  It may also be possible to be 
more specific about the nature of the communications that are subject to 
limitations.  For example, imposing restrictions only on initial communications 
seems to leave the door open for problems. 
But whatever policy is adopted, it must be followed to be effective.  U.S. 
Attorney David Iglesias conceded that he did not report the calls he received from 
his senator and congresswoman, despite the fact that he felt they were improper.351  
Perhaps Iglesias’ failure to comply with the policy was very unusual, but it 
suggests the desirability of enhancing efforts to publicize the policy within the 
Department and stress the importance of compliance.352  The question whether the 
idea of a statutory reporting requirement has merit turns on a determination of 
whether the problems encountered during the Bush administration were sui 
generis, or reflect a need for continuous oversight.353 
                                                                                                                            
349 See S. 1845, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007), and S. Rep. 110-203, supra note 344, at 7. 
350 Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, to Heads of Department 
Components and United States Attorneys 2 (December 19, 2007) (on file with the Ohio State Journal 
of Criminal Law). 
351 See supra text accompanying note 27. 
352 Cf. Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, supra note 350 (stating that 
one function of the memorandum was to “ensure that everyone is aware of the rules and their 
importance”). 
353 If a statutory reporting requirement were enacted, it would need to provide a mechanism to 
avoid making public sensitive information regarding ongoing investigations.  See S. REP. NO. 110-
 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 6:369 
 
438
4. Clarifying (and perhaps restricting) the scope of political corruption 
offenses 
 
Mechanisms that modulate political pressure and contact will be beneficial, 
but attention should also be given to the other aspect of the problem that was 
highlighted in the prosecutions of Georgia Thompson and former Governor 
Seigelman.354  The breadth and elasticity of the federal offenses used to prosecute 
state and local corruption enhance the scope of federal law and, accordingly, also 
enhance the scope of prosecutorial discretion.  There is much less dispute about the 
propriety of a federal prosecution that is based upon a corrupt quid pro quo, and 
the decision to bring such a prosecution is generally based solely on the strength of 
the evidence.  In the case of the more amorphous argument that a state or local 
official deprived the citizens of his or her honest services, however, the prosecutor 
is not merely assessing the strength of the evidence, but in many cases is also 
seeking to expand the definition of the conduct that constitutes a crime.  It is easy 
to see why prosecutions of the latter sort generate claims of unfairness when the 
defendants are members of the party that does not control the executive branch, 
and hence the power of prosecution. 
The question whether (and how) to redefine the offenses of mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and federal program bribery falls outside the scope of this article, but it is 
clearly one important piece of the puzzle that should be reexamined.  Legislation 
defining the offenses in question more clearly would be desirable, but it is not the 
only way to achieve greater clarity about the scope of these offenses.  Because of 
the importance of providing clear standards in this context, this might be an 
appropriate topic for uniform national standards spelled out in the U.S. Attorneys 
Manual.355  It would be particularly helpful if the Manual addressed and provided 
guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the use of broad amorphous 
offenses, such as mail fraud, in the specific context of public corruption offenses 
where the Manual might address, for example, the question whether a quid pro quo 
is required.  One problem with this approach is that provisions in the U.S. 
Attorneys Manual are not ordinarily judicially enforceable.356 
                                                                                                                            
203, supra note 344, at 11 (minority view of Sen. Kyl). 
354 See supra text accompanying notes 83–122. 
355 Dan Kahan has gone further, advocating that Congress formally delegate interpretive 
authority to the Department of Justice, “whose reasonable, pre-litigation interpretations of vaguely 
worded criminal statutes would be binding on the courts” under a Chevron regime.  See Dan M. 
Kahan, Reallocating Interpretative Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Executive Branch, 61 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 53–54 (1998). 
356 See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 175–85 (2003) (describing cases holding that defendants may 
not enforce various Department of Justice guidelines).  See also id. at 196 (arguing that courts should 
allow defendants to use violations of internal guidelines as evidence of prosecutorial misconduct and 
require prosecutors who did not comply with departmental guidelines to bear the burden of showing 
they did not engage in misconduct). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The principal responsibility for federal prosecutions in each federal judicial 
district should remain in the hands of a presidential appointee who has been 
confirmed by the Senate.  To be sure, as Part I demonstrates, some serious 
problems occurred during the Bush Administration, and other charges remain 
under review.  Moreover, these problems are not unique to one administration.  But 
as noted in Part III, measures can be taken to modulate or block pressures that 
might distort the U.S. Attorney’s decision making in individual cases.  Those 
measures are preferable to converting the position of U.S. Attorney to a career civil 
service role.  The Department’s current two-level structure and its very large 
number of presidential appointees are anomalous, but they serve important 
functions: increasing the effectiveness of the U.S. Attorneys as the chief law 
enforcement officer in each district, and preserving the local orientation of federal 
criminal law enforcement. 
